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ELEMENTS
OF
RELIGIOUS LIFE
FATHER HUMPHREY, SJ.
I *7> • ^
7 / *f F.ONDON AND LEAMINGTON
AR'J' AND BOOK COMPANY
NE\V YORK, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO : BEX/IGER BROTHERS 1895
PREFACE.
IN 1884, I published in three volumes, under the title of " The Religious State," a Digest of the doctrine of Suarez con tained in his treatise De Statu Religionis.
That work was, on account of the length of it, somewhat expensive. The present volume contains the marrow of the larger work, and is published at a price which places it within the reach of all whom the subject concerns.
WILLIAM HUMPHREY, S.J.
114, MOUNT STREET, LONDON, W. Lent,
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I. THE STATK OF PERFECTION.
The idea of a State i
The state of Christian life 2
The state of common life 3
The state of perfection 4
Perfection of charity - 6
Difference between holiness and perfection 7
Perfection, and the state of perfection 9
Five conditions of the state of perfection 10
Counsels as distinct from precepts 1 1
General or universal counsels 12
Particular counsels 13
Three degrees in perfection of charity 16
The state of perfection to be acquired i~
The state of perfection to be excrdscit 18
Perfection of P>ishops — Parish Priests ( Parochi ) 59, 20
CHAPTER II. CONSTITUTION OF THE RELIGIOUS STATE.
Necessity of the counsels to this state 23
Necessity of vows to this state 26
Cenobitic and solitary religious life - 2S
Difference between a. promise and & donation 29
Donation and delivery of himself by a religious 30
Simple vows and solemn vows in general 97, 31
Simple and solemn vows of chastity 143, 34 Simple and solemn vows of poverty 118, 109, 37 Simple and solemn vows of obedience - 147, 38
vi Contents.
PAGE
Approbation of Religious Orders 40
History of Approbation .... 42
Pontifical Approbation— Episcopal Approbation 44
Religious Congregations. Diocesan Congregations 45
Method of procuring Approbation - 46
Necessity of Jurisdiction - 47
Jurisdiction — Dominative power 204, 48
The Bishop, as Superior of Religious who are not exempt - 50
The religious state of Divine origin 5 1
The Apostles, as religious - 52
Pious, and religious, but secular Congregations 53
CHAPTER III. ENTRANCE INTO RELIGION.
Age, as requisite for entrance - 54
Parental oblation of children 56
Hindrances to entrance - 57
The case of Parish priests, and of priests in cure of souls 20, 59
Clerics and the Mission oath - 60
Obligation of a son towards his father 61
Obligation of a father towards his son 64 Letters : Testimonial from the Ordinary required for lawful
entrance - 68
Vocation to religious life — simply as such - 69
Vocation to clerical religious life 324, 73
Leave of parents 7()
Reception to religious life 77
Effects of entrance 79
Period of probation, or noviceship 80
Continuance and interruption of probation 82
Obligations, and powers, of novices - - 338, 85
CHAPTER IV. RELIGIOUS PROFESSION.
The substance of religious profession -
Formal effects of religious profession - 89
External formalities in profession 90
Contents. vii
Conditional profession - 92
Extrinsic effects of religious profession 93
Commutation of previous vows - 94
The bond of religious profession 95 Dispensation from solemn profession - ~ 31* 97
Invalid religious profession 9&
Ratification of invalid profession 99
Effect of " Renovation of vows" - 101
Mode of Renovation of vows by Nuns - 102
CHAPTER V.
RKLIGIOUS POVERTY.
Voluntary and perpetual poverty - 103
Poverty, as a title for Ordination - 105
Remote and proximate matter of poverty - 106
Dominion, or ownership - - 108 Solemn and simple vows of poverty 31, 37> IO9
Usufruct. Use. Possession. Administration -no
Various sins against a vow of poverty - 112
Measure of a mortal sin against poverty - 113
Four possible modes of religious poverty - 115
Incapability of ownership - - 117
Solemnity of a vow of poverty - . 37, n&
Individual poverty — and Comnmnity poverty - 119
Which is the most perfect mode of religious poverty ? - 120
Acceptance — as an act of ownership - 122
Leave — express — presumed - 123
Retention — as an act of ownership - 124
Tacit and presumed leave - - I25
Unjust and unlawful leave - 127
Acceptance of a loan by a religious - 128
Distribution of alms by religious - 129
The making of gifts by religious - 130
Proprietary /*«///£ - - 131
Actual use, and right to use - 132
Superfluities - 133
Obligations of Superiors with regard to poverty - 134
viii Contents \
CHAPTER VI.
Is.Ki.ir.ious CHASTITY.
PACJK
Necessary chastity, and voln ntary chastity - 136
Matrimony, with a vow of chastity - 137
The implicit vow in Sacred Orders - 140
Conditions and effects of a solemn vow of chastity 34, 143
Dissolution of unconsummated matrimony - - 1 45
CHAPTER VII. RKI.IGIOUS OBF.DIKNCK.
Obedience, as it is matter of a vow 38, 147
Power of Superiors with regard to obedience - 149
Precepts " in virtue of obedience " 164, 152
Obedience, in relation to the Rule - 153
Relaxation of Rule - 156
Limitation of obedience - 158
Subordination among Superiors - - 159
The Sovereign Pontiff, as pt incipal Superior of all Orders - 161
The Bishop's power in Congregations which are not exempt - 162
The power of a General Superioress - 163 Power to prescribe /// virtue of obedience - \ ^2. 164
The substance of actual obedience - 165
Perfection of obedience - 166
The motive of obedience - 167
The specific and formal character of obedience - 168
The virtue of obedience, as wider than the vow 171
Affections at variance with obedience - - 172
Affections in aid of obedience - - 173
Obedience as regards the understanding and judgment 175
" Blind obedience " - - 177
CHAPTER VIII. TMK Oin.KiATioxs OK Ri.i.unors.
A religious Rule - 180 Religious Constitutions, and Statutes - 234, 181 The obligation of the Rule - - 183
Contents.
Four ways in which this may be declared - -185
Transgression of the Rule - - 186
Obligation to progress in perfection - -187
Contempt of the Rule " !^9
The obligation of the religious habit - I91
The law of religious Enclosure - - T94
Papal enclosure— Episcopal enclosure - 198
The enclosure of Nuns - X99
The enclosure of religious Missionaries - 200
CHAPTER IX. RELIGIOUS SUPERIORS.
Necessity for the existence of Superiors - - 203
Dominative power — Power of jurisdiction - 48,204 @#oj/-episcopal jurisdiction in exempt Orders - 211.206
Supreme Prelates— Generals - • 207
Intermediate Prelates— Provincials - 208
Provincial : Vicaresses - - - 209
Local or Conventual Superiors - 210
Creation of Supreme Prelates - - 214
Solemnities of election - 216
Disadvantages of creation by election - 220
Election of Abbesses - 222
Perpetual Prelatures — Temporary Prelatures - 223
Advantages and disadvantages of both - 224
Directive power - 228
Power to make perpetual statutes - 229
The taking of counsel in making precepts - - 231
A General Chapter, as compared with a General Prelate - 232 Promulgation of laws and statutes • - 181,234
Coercive power - - - 236
Power of Superioresses of Nuns - - 238
" Manifestation of conscience " - - - 239
Leave for, and prohibition of Communion - - 240
Appeals by Religious - 242
Simple recourse to Superior Prelates - 243
Power of dispensation in religious Prelates - - 246
Power to absolve in religious Prelates - 249
Contents.
Power of reservation of sins in religious Prelates - 250
Power of administration of goods in religious Prelates - 251
CHAPTER X.
MINISTRIES ENTRUSTED TO RELIGIOUS.
faculty to preach the Word of God - - 255
Faculty to hear confessions - 257
Episcopal approbation of religious confessors - - 258
Faculty to administer the Eucharist - 263
Recitation of the Canonical Office - 266
Attention and intention in prayer - 267
CHAPTER XI. DEPARTURE FROM RELIGIOUS LIIK.
Five degrees of sin in unlawful departure - - 270
" Flight from the monastery " - 271
Apostasy — internal and external - - 272
Duties of religious Superiors towards fugitives and apostates - 273
Obligations of apostates towards their Order - 274
Co-operators with apostates . 275
Expulsion of religious . 276
Obligations of expelled religious - . 278
Relation of expelled religious to the local Bishop - 281
Leave for a religious to live outside his monastery - 287
Departure from one religious Order to another . 290 In what way may one Order be reckoned to be more peifect
than another ? - ... 292
Three ways of modification of an Order from its first institution - 294 Reasonable cause for lawful dispensation to pass to a less strict
Order . 295
Pontifical Privileges which forbid departure to another Order - 297 Obligation of Superiors with regard to leave for departure to
another Order . 298 Twofold difference between the effects of Common Law and the
effects of a Privilege . 299
Departure as it affects ownership of goods -300
Obligations of religious who become Bishops - 303
Obligations of religious who become Cardinals - 305
Contents. xi
CHAPTER XII. VARIETY OK RELIGIOUS LIFK WITHIN THE RELIGIOUS STATE.
PAGE
The advantages of this variety 3IO» 3°6
Variety of end, and variety of means - 3°7
Cenobites — Anchorites— Eremites - 311
Military Orders of religious men - 312
Contemplative Orders — Active Orders - 3*4
The mixed religious life - 3l&
Which is the more perfect life ? - 3*8
Two kinds of excellence in religious means - - 322
Austerity — Penance — Strictness of Rule - 323
The clerical religious state — The monastic religious state - 324
Mendicant religious Orders • 32"
Clerks Regular - - 32&
Canons Regular - 329 Orders of religious women - 54, 102, 163, 199, 209, 222, 238, 330
Conservatories. Tertiaries - - 333
Power to receive a Nun to religious life - 33^
Widows, and women who are not virgins - 337
The goods of Novices in Convents of women 85, 338
Obligations of religious women - - 34°
^sVV^^^>^^\
*{jm,^:)
ELEMENTS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE.
CHAPTER I. The State of Perfection.
THE word State takes its meaning from stability. When
applied to a rational being, it always implies two things
(i) perfection in some condition of life, or manner of living, and (2) stability therein.
In every state there must exist some bond of obligation to continue in a particular condition of life, in order to give to that condition of life the stability which is of the idea of a state.
This obligation must, moreover, proceed from a perman ent cause, or a cause which cannot easily be removed. Possibility of change is not contrary to the idea of a state. That idea does not demand a bond which is necessarily and absolutely or physically indissoluble. It is satisfied by a bond or cause of obligation which is morally fixed and permanent.
All states of life among mortal men may be reduced to the two general states of freedom and of bondage.
The stability of the state of freedom arises from natural law, since man is created naturally free. This natural freedom it is not so easy to undo. This difficulty of
2 Element!; of Religious Life.
undoing suffices for the idea of a state, although by the will of the free man himself, or as a just punishment, his freedom may be taken away.
The state of a religions, or regular, is a state of bondage, inasmuch as it induces a subjection and obligation which has a permanent cause. The state of a secular is a state of freedom, of freedom, namely, from the religious yoke and obligation. It has a stable and permanent cause of freedom in the natural right of freedom, so long as the free man has not voluntarily subjected himself to the religious yoke.
The secular state is divided into the clerical state, and the state of laymen.
The clerical state is a state of bondage, inasmuch as in it a man is specially dedicated and consecrated to divine ministries. This consecration is commenced by means of a sacramental, namely, by the first tonsure, which is permanent in so far that it cannot be reiterated. It is gradually brought to its perfection by means of an im mutable sacrament which imprints an indelible character.
The state of laymen is a natural state of freedom from clerical obligations.
The state of wedlock is a state of bondage, which is rooted in a permanent cause.
The state of Christian life is the state of men who are members of one mystical body, or spiritual and super natural commonwealth, the members of which are united one with another by one common faith, by profession of faith, and by sacraments, under one Head, and are ordained towards the attainment of eternal life in everlasting blessedness by fitting and sufficient means.
7 lie State of Perfection. 3
In this state of Christian life there is found great stability. Its stability springs, in the first place, from the stability of the Church of Christ ; secondly, from the obligation of permanence in it which is induced by baptism; and thirdly, from the unchangeableness of the faith, and the aids to perseverance which the state supplies.
2.
The state of Christian life is divided .into the state of common life, and the state of perfection. Christian life comprehends a state which is general and common to all the faithful, inasmuch as it is necessary for the salva tion of every one of them — and another state which is more special, supplying, as it does, besides the necessary means of salvation, many more.
In Christian life perfection has to be considered as it is twofold. There is a perfection which is essential to Christian life. This perfection consists in the life of grace and charity. In order to at least this essential perfection the Christian profession is ordained. This profession brings within reach of all who embrace it the necessary and sufficient means of essential perfection. It is called the state of common life, not as if in that life men may not do works of supererogation, and increase in spiritual perfection as much as they please, but inas much as this state of life does not of itself bind them to
such works or increase — it does not afford special means
and in it those works have no special principle of stability.
Man's perfection consists in union with his Maker, and it is charity which unites men to God. Perfection of Christian life consisting principally in charity, the state of perfection is principally ordained in order to the
4 Elements of Religious Life.
attainment of perfection of charity. Charity is said to suffice for perfection, not as excluding other virtues, but inasmuch as these necessarily accompany it, and rest upon it, and so contribute towards perfection. Perfec tion of Christian life includes, therefore, not only perfec tion of charity, but perfection of other virtues also, charity being the end and crown, or complement of per fection of all other virtues.
Chanty has regard immediately to God. Towards God it tends as towards its last end. All works, therefore, of other virtues are related by charity to this last end. Charity gives to exercises of other virtues their life, and their efficacy for merit, and the completeness of their perfection. Charity is the one perfection and form which constitutes all other virtues in the state of per fection. Charity gives to them not only completeness and perfection in order to their last end, and their power of meriting, but it gives to them also stability. It supplies to them a force which will be efficacious to resist all that which is contrary to them, along with an ease and pleasure in the practice of them. Virtues other than charity con tribute towards perfection as they are themselves instru ments of charity. To charity, as it is essential perfection, these virtues add an accidental perfection.
Faith and hope are materially necessary to perfection in this mortal life. They are not, however, necessary in themselves. They are necessary only by reason of the present imperfection of mortal men who are as yet in the state of the way. Hence it is not so much for faith and hope in themselves, as it is for the sake of charity that they are required. In this sense charity alone is to be esteemed the queen and essence of perfection. Faith and hope are, nevertheless, to be regarded as wedded to
The State of Perfection. 5
charity, and as bound up therewith by a straiter bond and necessity than are other virtues. Perfection of faith and hope, therefore, is not so much an accidental as it is an essential perfection. It closely approaches the essential, and it in a manner belongs to its integrity. Faith is the foundation, and hope is the support of charity.
A love of God which should be a love of infinite perfection, and adequate to the divine loveableness, is absolutely impossible to any mere creature.
A perfection of love such as should demand perpetuity and unchangeableness in actual love without any intermis sion, and such as should include a purity of heart which is incompatible with any venial fault, or with the smallest defect or difficulty in doing the will of God, belongs only to the Blessed. To those who are still in the state of the way, this perfection is — so far as the ordinary law of spiritual life is concerned, and apart from special privilege — impossible.
The essential perfection of charity consists in this, that (rod is loved for Himself with the whole heart and mind, or appreciatively above all things. God is really loved in this way by every man who possesses habitual charity, and who is therefore in the state of grace. If, besides this habitual charity, a man's charity is also actual, this actual charity adds a perfection to the habit of charity. This perfection of actual charity lies, therefore, outside the essence of charity.
Charity may be either remiss or intense. When charity is intense, its intensity is a perfection which intrinsically increases charity beyond that which the mere existence of charity essentially demands.
6 Elements of Religious Life.
Charity may also be more or less extensive as regards its object. It is more extensive when a man not only loves God, but loves his neighbour also for the sake of God. A man may so love God above all things as to have a steady purpose never grievously to offend God, and never to turn away from Him for the sake of any cause or creature. This man, however, loves God with a greater limitation of love, and with less extension of heart than does the man who so loves God as for God's sake to have the purpose to avoid the very smallest offence of God.
A still more universal love of God will be the love of the man who resolves not only to keep all God's com mandments, and to avoid all, even the smallest sins, but also to follow the divine counsels, and to take those means which lead to perfection of charity.
The perfection of charity, which is aimed at by the state of perfection, consists in a habitual state, in which a man is so disposed that he positively has power promptly, and without hindrance from himself, both to elicit and to command from himself acts of charity. He may possess this power, even if no act of charity should happen, as matter of fact, to be elicited.
This is the scope of the state of perfection, as that state is a way towards perfection, or as it is a manner of life which is adapted for the attaining of perfection. A man tends, by means of this state, not towards any one particular act, or even towards continuous operation, but towards acquiring of virtues, and towards bridling of the affections, and towards removal of all hindrances, so that he may at length arrive at that permanent and stable disposition in which he, as it were connaturally. should at
The State of Perfection. 7
some times make an act of the love of God, and should at other times make other acts of virtue, and always, so far as the frailty of mortal life will allow, avoid the very smallest sins. This disposition and state of a man, when it exists as a permanent habit, is — perfection of Christian life.
There is no definite intensity of habitual charity which is necessary in order to this perfection. Intensity itself will not suffice, although, all else being equal, it very much contributes thereto.
It might happen that a man was in the state of grace, and that he had a habit of charity which was very intense, and yet that man had not his passions mortified, and did not frequently, and still less ordinarily, do heroic or perfect acts of virtue, and even, and that very often, sinned venially. Such a man no one could say was perfect, or that he had attained to perfection of charity.
It might happen, on the other hand, that a man whose charity was less intense had his affections so moderated and under control that he should ordinarily and easily avoid all venial sins, and constantly exercise himself in virtues. Such a man would be in the state of the perfect.
There are many men who have really in them the fear of God so as to avoid all mortal sins, and thus to live in the state of grace, and who do the common works of virtue, such as prayer, almsgiving, fasting and the like, and who frequently receive the sacraments, and even say Mass daily, and nevertheless, although short of grievous offence of God, they live delicately, speak freely, or idly, or impatiently, or conduct themselves with similar defects, and are imperfect in their practice of works of super erogation. In such men there may exist a very intense
8 Elements of Religious Life.
habitual charity. Their habitual grace has been the result of a lengthened exercise of certain good and merito rious works, or — and chiefly ex open operato — has flowed from frequent and long-continued use of sacraments. These men, nevertheless, cannot be regarded as men who are studying perfection, nor are they perfect.
There are men, on the other hand, who within a shorter time, and without so assiduous a frequentation of the sacraments, but with greater diligence, have moderated their passions, have avoided any frequency of venial sins and other hindrances to progress in virtue, and have set themselves free from occasions of imperfection. These men have raised themselves to the state of the perfect, although without so great an intensive increase of charity. There is no certainly fixed degree, therefore, of intensity of grace and charity which is necessary and which suffices in order to this kind of perfection.
It follows that it may sometimes happen that a man who had once arrived at the degree of the perfect should fall therefrom. He might even become absolutely im perfect, without having sinned mortally. Even in his imperfection that man would still retain the same amount of grace, since grace cannot possibly be lost apart from mortal sin, nor is grace diminished by venial sins, or by imperfect works. In order to fall from the state of the perfect it may suffice that there should be voluntary frequency of venial sins, with too great indulgence of the affections and following of natural desires, along with remissness or omission of perfect acts of virtue.
It follows also that one man may be more holy before
The State of Perfection. 9
God than is another man who is more perfect, and con sequently that a man who is less perfect in this life, may through his greater amount of grace, attain to a greater glory in the life that is to come.
5-
Perfection and the state of perfection are two distinct things. A man may be perfect who has never been con stituted in the state of perfection. A man who is living in the state of perfection may, on the other hand, not be perfect. He may even possibly be living in the state of sin. All religious are in the state of perfection, but all religious are not perfect. Many secular and married men and women may be perfect, and nevertheless these are not constituted in the state of perfection.
Although the state of perfection is most excellently adapted for the acquiring of perfection, that state is nevertheless not a necessary means in order to the exis tence of perfection. Outside the state of perfection a man has it in his power to arrive at perfection. It is possible for him to do works of counsel spontaneously, and apart from any obligation, such as is that to which his voluntary entrance on a state of perfection would bind him.
The state of perfection, when compared with perfection itself, is as a means towards an end. It may be described as — a profession of life, or a manner of living, which is stable, and which has been instituted either for the acquir ing, or for the exercising of a man's own individual perfection in Christian life.
There are five conditions which are required in order to the existence of the state of perfection.
i. The manner of living must be external and visible.
io Elements of Religious Life.
It must consequently be embraced by means of an external act and profession. This is necessary, since this state has relation not only to the invisible God, but to God's visible Church. A man may bind himself by an internal vo\v to some special manner of living, for the >ake of his own spiritual good, and for the greater service of God, and he may attain to perfection, but that will not suffice to constitute such a state as will be an ecclesiastical state. His state of life will not be a state of perfection before God's visible Church.
2. The manner of living which is professed must have added to it an obligation or bond of permanence. This follows from the general idea of a state. A mere purpose for the future is not sufficient as a source of stability. Such a purpose may be changed, without either fault or liability to punishment ; and such a purpose is not confirmed by intervention of any law, either divine or human.
3. The obligation to this manner of living must be undertaken with some solemnity. There must be such solemnity as is necessary among men for the establishment of an obligation.
4. The state must be instituted for the doing of works of perfection.
5. Lastly, the actions which belong to a state of per fection must be external. The perfection towards which the state is ordained should be in proportion with the state itself, and that state is external and visible.
It does not follow that the state is ordained in order to external actions only, and not to internal actions, except in so far as these are necessary in order to external actions. The state is ordained also in order to even such internal acts as are completed within the mind alone.
The State of Perfection. 1 1
The distinction of counsels from precepts rests on faith so certain, and is so expressly set forth in the Sacred Scriptures, and in the tradition of the Church of God, that it cannot be denied without manifest heresy. It is of the idea of a counsel — as a counsel is distinguished from a precept — that it should concern a work which is not prescribed. It is not true, however, that every good work which is not prescribed is a work of counsel. In order that a work should be of counsel, it must be a work which is better than is a work which is opposed to it, or which is incompatible with it. To marry is not prescribed, and nevertheless to marry is not of counsel, although to marry is in itself good. Not to marry is not prescribed, and nevertheless not to marry is better than to marry, and, as better than the merely good deed of marrying, is of counsel.
Two conditions suffice to the idea of a counsel, as it is distinguished from a precept. These are, that the work counselled should not be prescribed — and that the work counselled should be not merely a good work, but a work which is better than is a work which is merely good. Any other conditions besides these two are either acciden tal to the existence of a counsel, or they are contained in these.
Counsels are divided into general counsels and particu lar counsels. A general or universal counsel is so called, not as if it did not concern particular and determinate matter — for this it must do, since all actions are single and individual — but because it is not for its own sake alone that the counsel is given. It is given for the sake of its useful ness in order to the practice of other virtues and especially
12 Elements of Religious Life.
in order to attaining to perfection of charity. A particular counsel is so called because it is given with regard to a certain work for the sole sake of the goodness of that particular work.
General counsels are three in number — the counsel of poverty, the counsel of chastity, and the counsel of obedience. Every one of these counsels is an aid in the exercise of all kinds of virtues. These counsels lend freedom to the soul from solicitude and anxieties which might lead men into danger of committing sin, and which hinder a man from giving himself wholly up to God. When these three counsels united are embraced, they sufficiently effect this freedom of soul.
To these general counsels, which are only three in number, if we regard the matter of them, may be added a fourth, by reason of a mode in which these counsels may be followed. It is of counsel to confirm these counsels by vow. To preserve virginity, even when virginity is em braced without a vow, is a counsel. To confirm the preservation of virginity by vow is a fresh counsel. The same is true with regard to the other general counsels. Since, however, this counsel of a vow may extend itself to the matter of all virtues — and since this counsel is, as it were, reflected upon the other counsels, and is made one with each of these — and since also this counsel in a manner transforms the counsel which it concerns into a precept, and makes that to be henceforward of necessity which formerly was free — the counsel of a vow is not usually enumerated among the general counsels, as distinct from them. It is reckoned as comprehended under them.
Those three counsels have therefore the name of
The State of Perfection. 13
Evangelical Counsels, or — the Counsels of Perfection, or simply— the Counsels.
Particular counsels may concern the matter of every virtue. Even as regards works of precept in any virtue, there may be particular counsels of the same works under certain circumstances. Those works may be of counsel by reason of a circumstance of time. That which is of precept at certain times may be done freely and of counsel at other times. Thus, to hear Mass or to fast on days which are not days of obligation, is of counsel. The love of enemies, which is of precept, is said to be of counsel when it extends to the bestowal of benefits and other signs of benevolence on an enemy at a time when these are not demanded by precept as due. Another circumstance of a work is that of quantity. A man who is bound by the precept of almsgiving, does a work of counsel when he gives larger alms than he is bound by precept to give. A third circumstance of a work is that of mode, or the manner in which it is done. A man may of counsel do a work more fervently, or for a higher end than that for which he is bound by precept to do that work.
Counsels may also concern not only works of virtue, but avoidances of evil. The counsel does not regard the not doing of evil, since that is always under precept, but it may regard means which are taken for avoidance of the evil.
That which is purely a counsel — or a counsel simply as such — induces no obligation under pain of any even venial sin. Works of counsel are spontaneous and free.
An external counsel of God — or a counsel which is ex ternally proposed by God to men — indicates simply a
14 Elements of Religious Life.
dictate of the Divine Intelligence judging and approving something as better adapted than that which is merely well and sufficiently adapted for the obtaining of eternal life, or as adapted for the more easily and the more perfectly obtaining of that life. It signifies what we ought to think of the special means of salvation which is counselled. To think otherwise would be an injury to the Divine Intelligence. Of this those would be guilty who should think wrongly of the Counsels.
For a man not to will to follow a particular counsel, not because he does not reckon it to be the best course to follow it, but because his will is for other reasons not inclined towards following it, is, on the other hand, not an injury to the Divine Majesty.
We may distinguish in God a twofold will — one will which is absolute, and which may be represented by the words / wni — and another will which is relative, and which we may represent by the words / would. A counsel does not in itself indicate in God such a will as should induce obligation. It indicates at most a simple affection and complacency in that which is better than its opposite which is merely good.
It is certain that Christian perfection cannot be attained without observance of counsels, over and above obser vance of the precepts. In speaking of counsels, however, we do not here restrict our meaning to the three principal counsels, but include even every better way of observing the precepts beyond that which in rigour a precept of itself demands.
Christian perfection — as it is distinguished from the state of perfection — demands observance of the precepts more
The State of Perfection. 15
principally than it demands observance of the counsels. That which is of the essence of a thing is more principal than are the accidents of that thing. Observance of the precepts is of the essence of Christian perfection, while observance of the counsels is an accidental perfection. That is accidental which cannot exist without the essential. Apart from, and without the perfection of the counsels, there may exist essential perfection of charity.
The state of perfection is ordained in order to perfection of both precepts and counsels together. Of the two, however, the state of perfection has regard more princi pally to the precepts than to the counsels. Observance of the precepts is more necessary. It is also the founda tion of observance of the counsels.
Hence the state of perfection embraces observance of all and every one of the precepts. It does not embrace all counsels. It embraces those counsels only which are neces sary as means towards the end of perfection, in accordance with the circumstances and conditions of particular Insti tutes. The counsels are observed for the sake of the precepts. They, as it were, surround and protect the precepts.
The state of perfection is, nevertheless, in itself con stituted by profession of the counsels. The essence of the state of perfection, therefore, consists in the counsels rather than in the precepts. This is manifest, inasmuch as the state of perfection itself is not of precept, but of counsel.
The act of profession of the counsels suffices to con stitute the state of perfection without observance of the precepts. A man may be in the state of perfection, and, nevertheless, that man may not be perfect.
1 6 Elements of Religious Life.
7-
The obligation of the state of perfection is not induced without the consent of the man who embraces that state. An obligation of this kind must be either induced or imposed by some act, since it is in itself neither natural nor necessary. A man is neither naturally born, nor is he supernaturally born again by baptism into the state of perfection. The obligation of the state of perfection is not imposed, since the state itself is not of precept. The obligation of this state, therefore, if it is to exist, must be induced by a man's own consent and deliberate act.
In the state of perfection there are three degrees. There is the degree or grade of "beginners" — the degree of " those who are making progress " — and the degree of those who are " perfect."
The charity of a beginner is that charity which is not only hindered from easy and pleasurable operation by occa sion of concupiscences and other as yet unmortified passions, but is imperilled by them.
This state is called the state of conflict, or the state of the purgative way. In that state a man's principal care is to resist concupiscences and to mortify his passions, while he is at the same time nourishing and fostering charity itself.
The second degree of charity, or the charity of a man who is in the class of those who are " making progress," begins when his passions have been calmed, so that the conflict with concupiscence, especially in view of any grievous fall, is no longer his first care. He can now promptly and with ease give himself to works of virtue, and to increase of charity.
This state is called the state of the illuminative way-
Tlu: State of Perfection. 17
In it the mind is more and more enlightened in order to works of virtue.
The third degree of charity, or the charity of \\\e perfect, begins when the passions have been so conquered, and when the soul has been so habituated to works of virtue, that it can promptly and pleasurably exercise itself in the proper and most perfect exercise of charity, which is — the love of God.
This is the state which is called the state of the unitive way. By love of God the soul is united to God.
Those three states are not distinguished one from the other as if each of them was complete in itself, or as if in the first and second a man was to rest satisfied. In the third, moreover, a man has not arrived at the goal of increase, so that there may be no further progress.
The state of perfection is divided into the u state of perfection to be acquired" and the " state of perfection to be exercised"
Bishops are in the state of perfection, by reason of their episcopal dignity, and nevertheless Bishops are not in the " state of perfection to be acquired" Between this state and the "state of perfection to be exercised" there is no middle or third state, as there is no middle or third state between the state of a teacher and the state of his disciple. While Bishops stand in need of personal perfection, they nevertheless do not receive any special means of acquiring it in virtue of their state. They have, in virtue of their state, those means only by which they exercise perfection for the benefit of others.
The distinction between the two states is real and
B
1 8 Elements of Religious Life.
adequate, as is the distinction between a thing to be done and a thing to be received, or between a man's acquiring a thing for himself, and his communicating that thing toothers.
A man may exercise himself in works of perfection, although he himself is not perfect. A man may persuade another man to be chaste, while he himself is not chaste. A man may induce another man to practise poverty, although he himself does not even profess poverty.
The stability which is required in order to the idea of a state is, in the episcopate as it is a state of perfec tion, derived not from consecration but from prelature. Episcopal consecration is indelible, but it does not con stitute a state of perfection. It does not bind the man who has been consecrated to the doing of any works of perfection. It only bestows a capacity and power for the performance of episcopal actions, so far as power of Order is concerned. It does not give pastoral rights. It does not of itself bind the Bishop to any works of counsel or perfection ; neither does it of itself and ex officio bind him to the enlightening and perfecting of others. A Bishop is, in virtue of his consecration, bound only by reason of his episcopal dignity to give a greater example of virtue and good living within the sphere of the precepts. This is an obligation which is common, in its measure, to all persons who are placed in any dignity. It does not by itself suffice to constitute a special state, and much less a state of perfection.
The stability of the episcopate, as it is a state of per fection, springs from prelature. The episcopate once accepted carries with it a perpetual obligation of perma nence in the episcopal office, so that this office cannot be laid aside at the Bishop's will. This moral stability is sufficient in order to the idea of a state. Consecration
77/6' State of Perfection. 19
adds nothing to his state, but gives him power to do acts which, if he were not consecrated, he could not possibly perform. It is then when a Bishop has been elected and confirmed that he enters on the state of perfection.
That which specifically constitutes the episcopate as a " state of perfection to be exercised" consists in the actions to which the episcopate as it is a state binds a Bishop, and to which it perpetually dedicates him. His functions are of the most perfect kind. They are to enlighten, to purify, and to perfect other men. As the royal state may be called a state of prudence and fortitude, not because it furnishes these virtues, or teaches how they are to be acquired, but because it demands them and supposes possession of them, if the royal office is to be rightly exercised — and as the office of a teacher may be called a state of learning, not because it makes a man learned, but because it supposes and requires in him that already acquired perfection — so is the state of a Bishop rightly called a state of perfection or the state of a perfect man.
Since consecration does not place Bishops, still less will ordination place priests in the " state of perfection to be. exercised." Neither ordination nor episcopal conse cration binds or deputes persons to works of perfection. Although clerics are bound to minister worthily, they in rigour satisfy this obligation by observance of the pre cepts, and by ministering in the state of grace.
Priests are bound by reason of the excellence of their ministry, and the works for the sake of which they are ordained, especially the offering to God of the Divine Sacrifice, to great virtue and goodness of life. All Christians have, in their measure, the same obligation, since all Christians are bound to communicate, and at the
2O Elements of Religious Life.
same time to approach worthily so great a sacrament. The difference between priests and laymen in this matter is a difference only of greater and less within the same sphere of the common way of the precepts, and the general state of Christian life.
Parish priests (parochi) are proper pastors. They are not officials of the Bishop, as is his Vicar. They are not the Bishop's instrumental causes. They are themselves principal proximate causes. They are masters of their own benefices. They exercise their own proper power and office. They fulfil their own obligation. They do not merely execute the obligation of another. It matters not that parish priests (parochi) are, as it were, coadjutors of the Bishop, for the Bishops themselves are cooperators with the Sovereign Pontiff, " being called to a share of his solicitude, although not to the plenitude of his power." As the Bishops are true principal pastors in their own order, although they are subject to a superior Pastor, so inferior pastors are in their own grade proper pastors, although they are subordinate to their Bishops.
Inferior pastors, and priests in cure of souls — although by force of law their position may seem to possess stability, yet, looking to the fact of the absence of any bond or even purpose ot perpetual permanence in their benefices, they cannot be said to enter on a state. They rather hold for the time being a ministry, an office, or an ecclesiastical dignity. They share in the obligation and exercise of perfection in virtue of their function, whether it is to be called a state or an office. Given that it is a state, they will, to the extent in which they so share, be in the "state of perfection to be txtrcistd. "
In the case of a priest, sacerdotal ordination usually
The State of Perfection. 2 i
precedes his promotion to be a parish priest (parochus) and true pastor, and so by means of ordination this state of per fection is, as it were, begun in simple priests. When the pastoral care is added, this in a manner completes in its degree a sort of " state of perfection to be exercised" In the case of a Bishop, on the other hand, his election and con firmation frequently, if not generally, precede his consecra tion, and it is then when he has been elected and confirmed that he enters on the state of perfection.
The state of Bishops is more perfect than is any religious state, as the state of perfection to be exercised is of its kind more perfect than is the state of perfection to be acquired. There is here no question of comparison between persons and their individual merits. The com parison is between states, and the conditions and qualities of these states.
There are four differences between the state of Religious, and the state of Bishops.
1. The religious state is the state of perfection to be acquired, while the episcopal state is a state of perfection to be exercised or communicated.
2. The episcopal state supposes perfection in him who is assumed to it, while the religious state does not suppose perfection in him who professes it.
3. The religious state demands removal of hindrances to the acquiring of perfection, and so it is constituted by vows of the counsels of perfection. The episcopal state does not of itself demand this.
4. The episcopal state has attached to it dignity, honour and power, along with disposal of temporal goods. The religious state requires poverty, subjection and renunciation of temporal goods.
22 Elements of Religious Life.
Although the episcopal state is more perfect than any other states, there is, nevertheless, and by reason of the adjuncts of that state, peril in the desire of it. Desire of it is there fore, morally speaking, not praiseworthy, or to be advised. For the same reason the episcopal state is not matter of a vow. The religious state, although it is less perfect as a state, is, on the other hand, better than is any other merely good thing which is incompatible with it. The religious state has not the perils of the episcopate. It removes hindrances to perfection, and the incentives to those vices which hinder perfection. The religious state may therefore be desired, and may rightly be advised. It may also be vowed.
The religious state is, as it were, a holocaust, by which a man consecrates himself, and all that he has, the whole of his life and his will, to God. A secular in cure of souls does not so bind himself. A parish priest, although by reason of his office there is demanded of him a blame less and exemplary life, is not bound, as such, to more than that common manner of good living which consists in obser vance of the precepts. When pastors of souls enter on the religious state, it is in order that they may be placed in the state of perfection. Religious, on the other hand, avoid the pastoral care, in order that they may the better profess perfection. The religious state is matter of counsel. The position of those who have cure of souls is not matter of counsel. The more voluntarily the religious state is entered upon, the better and the more prudently is this done. The more under compulsion, or through inducement of superiors, or from obedience, the cure of souls is under taken, the more safely is it accepted.
CHAPTER II. Constitution of the Religious State.
THE " state of perfection to be acquired''' and the " state of religion " are one and the same. They are the same both in their end, and in their means. They differ in name only.
The intrinsic and proximate end of the state of perfection is perfection of charity, as perfection is possible in this life, and to mortal men, and as it is to be arrived at by observance not of the precepts only but of the counsels also. The extrinsic end of the state of perfection is that perfec tion of charity which obtains alone in heaven.
Although perfection of charity is, speaking absolutely, the end of all and of every Christian life, it is nevertheless an end which is aimed at in a special manner, and with the aid of special means, in the religious state.
In order to the religious state, as commonly, strictly, and properly so called, the three counsels — of poverty — of chastity — and of obedience — are necessary and essential. We must here again and carefully distinguish between perfection in itself, and the state of perfection. In order to attain perfection, renunciation of riches is most useful, and is morally necessary. It is nevertheless not absolutely necessary. It is possible for a rich man by making good use of his riches, and by doing at the same time other works of
24 Riements of Religious
perfection, to arrive at perfection. In order, however, to the state of perfection, in the integrity of that state, profes sion of poverty is absolutely necessary. Without removal of hindrances to perfection, the state of perfection cannot exist as such. Hindrances to perfection are in no small measure removed by embracing poverty.
With regard to chastity also we must again distinguish between perfection in itself, and the state of perfection. Perfection chiefly consists in union with God, and solicitude to please His Divine Majesty. The conjugal state divides the heart. It carries with it many cares and anxieties. Of its own nature it greatly hinders spiritual progress and the attaining of perfection.
Continence therefore, as removing hindrances to per fection, is morally necessary in order to the acquiring of perfection. To a perfect religious state continence is absolutely necessary. It is of the very idea of that state that it should be a state of life which is absolutely un encumbered, and which is thereby rendered easy for the acquiring of perfection. It must therefore exclude all things which should notably hinder perfection, or render perfection difficult.
Morally speaking, any true profession of poverty can. scarcely exist apart from continence or celibacy. Wedlock necessarily carries with it solicitude for the temporal goods which are necessary for the support of a family. Fathers are bound to lay up for their children.
So also as regards the counsel of voluntary obedience — as it is distinguished from the necessary obedience which is due to precepts, whether human or divine.
Constitution of the Religious State. 23
By reason of man's natural self-love, which hinders self- knowledge, self-judgment, self-government, and self-cure, the way of obedience is the safest of all ways towards perfection. It removes all peril of self-will and of self-love. It is also most pleasing to God by reason of the humility in which it has its foundation. As the vow of poverty cuts off solicitude with regard to one's temporal goods, so does the vow of obedience cut off solicitude with regard to one's own self.
That which is true of the three counsels separately is true also of the three counsels together. The three counsels together are necessary in order to the religious state. It is of the very idea of the religious state that a man should renounce all created goods which might hinder his perfect love of God. By profession of poverty, external goods are renounced. By profession of chastity are re nounced one's natural rights over one's own body. By profession of obedience there is renounced one's own will. By obedience a man consecrates to God his will. So doing he consecrates the whole of his being to God's perfect service.
The three counsels — of poverty, chastity and, obedience— of themselves suffice to the essence of the religious state, or suffice to constitute the substance of that state. They suffice to remove all obstacles which hinder charity. The hindrances to charity are chiefly three in number. There is desire of riches, there is desire of the delights of sense, and there is the inordination of the human will. These hindrances are re moved by profession of poverty, of chastity, and of voluntary obedience. Worldly solicitude is also threefold. There is
solicitude for riches — there is solicitude for one's family and.
there is solicitude with regard to the regulation of one's own
26 Elements of Religious Life.
actions. The first anxiety is removed by profession of poverty. The second anxiety is removed by profes sion of celibacy. The third anxiety is removed by profession of obedience.
Those three counsels contain the substance of the re ligious state. They are its primary and its principal founda tions. To those three counsels all other counsels which may be adapted towards the end of the religious state, may be reduced.
Although chastity and poverty might in a manner be ob served by a purpose of the will alone, apart from any bond of obligation, obedience could not — in matter which is purely voluntary and not of precept — be exercised without some preexisting bond of obligation to obey. Obedience supposes a directive, or even a coercive power of prescrib ing. This there cannot be, as regards matter which is other wise free from the obligation of any precept, unless there has been first a voluntary subjection of himself to a superior by the man to whom that superior prescribes.
Apart from such previous subjection there will be a purpose of following the counsels of another person, rather than a purpose of obeying his precepts.
In order that this subjection should not only exist, but should also subsist and persevere, it must have a perpetual source in some bond of obligation. This obligation will first fall on the three principal counsels which are of the substance of the religious state, and which are essential to the existence of that state. The obligation must be with out limit, and must therefore be perpetual or life-long. The end of the religious state being perfection of charity in this life and in the life to come, permanence in the
Constitution of the Religious State. 2 7
religious state to the close of this life is necessary. A bond of life-long obligation is therefore necessarily of the idea of the religious state,
It is also of the idea and essence of the religious state that it should be confirmed by means of vows which are made to God. That state alone is religious which is in it self and primarily consecrated to God. A state cannot be thus consecrated to God by means of a promise which is made to man. The only way in which it can be conse crated to God is by means of a promise which is made to God. A human promise, if it is a private promise, can always be dissolved by mutual consent of him who made it, and of him to whom it was made. Such a promise will not suffice to constitute a proper and true religious and ecclesiastical state, unless the promise is confirmed by vow, and with the sanction of public authority.
It belongs, moreover, to perfection not only to do a per fect work, but also to vow the doing of that perfect work. Counsel concerns both. Hence the man who of vow does a perfect work, has doubled his perfection.
In order to constitute the religious state, a vow of obedience alone will not suffice, even if through that vow there should emerge an obligation both to poverty and to chastity. Religious profession binds immediately both to poverty and to chastity, and that independently of any precept of a superior. The two vows, of poverty and chastity, pro duce special effects, which a vow of obedience, which has merely occasioned obligations of poverty and chastity, could not produce. These vows of poverty and chastity are such that a superior has no power to make any change in them. The observance of them does not depend upon a
28 Elements of Religions Life.
superior's will. When in the verbal profession, which is made in any Order, which is truly and properly a religious Order, express mention is made only of obedience accord ing to the Rule, there is always therein understood to be included the making of the two vows of poverty and chastity, as these are contained in that Rule.
The religious state may in itself be constituted in either of two ways — either in a religious community — or in solitary life. In the present practice of the Church, the form.er is the only actually existing mode of the religious state. It is cenobitic — that is to say, the religious state is embraced in some ecclesiastical community, in which, under one head, and under an approved rule of life, the religious profess the way of perfection.
The other mode of the religious state, in a solitary life, was in early ages far from uncommon. Religious virgins were wont to have their dwelling within the precincts of their paternal homes. They had made their religious profession in the hands of the Bishop, and they had received from him the sacred veil. This was no mere pro fession of virginity only. These women were true religious. As such, they were said to be specially consecrated.
The same mode of the religious state was practised also by men. It is even most probable that religious dedication of themselves bv men to God in solitary life preceded the adoption of the cenobitic or common life. These anchorites were living in a true religious state. For existence of the religious state the condition of common life is not in itself necessary. Common life simply adds one other means in order to the acquiring of perfection. It is a school of perfection.
Constitution of the Religious State. 2 9
Keeping in view this distinction of those two modes of the religious state, we say that by means of religious vows a man so gives and delivers himself to God, as in a special manner to transfer the dominion or ownership of himself to God. This is only then effected when these vows are accepted in the name of God, by God's Church.
Since the religious state is an ecclesiastical state, the donation and delivery of himself which is made by a religious must be accepted by the Church. Donation has no force or efficacy to transfer dominion to another, unless the donation is accepted by that other who is the person to whom it is made.
The Divine Majesty does not immediately and by Himself directly accept any donation which is made to Him. Acceptance must be transacted by God's Church in the name of God, and through some minister who is empowered to act in name of that Church. The donation and delivery of himself by a religious must therefore be made /";/ the hands of some man.
Acceptance of a donation is necessary of the very nature of the case. Donation, being a contract, cannot be perfected and completed without the consent of both donor and donee.
There is, therefore, a most distinct difference between a promise which is made to God, and a donation which is made to God. A promise simply binds the person who has made it to do that which he has promised to do. A donation requires acceptance by the other side. The consequence of acceptance is the acquiring of right over that which has been given and delivered.
In order to constitute the religious state, when that
3O Elements of Religious Life.
state is embraced in a religious community, it is neces sary that, besides the divine obligation of the three substantial vows, which are made immediately to God, there should be a special human obligation — or an obliga tion as between man and man— by way of reciprocal covenant. In virtue of this covenant the religious gives himself to a religious Order and is bound to that Order. In virtue of the same covenant the "religious Order accepts his donation and delivery of himself. That religious body is, therefore, henceforth bound to the religious as to a member. It is bound to the support, to the care, and to the government of this new member in accordance with its Institute.
In the religious state, a religious becomes a member of a mystical body. This is effected through union between the whole and the part. This union, as it is a moral union, is effected by means of a mutual bond of obliga tion. Since this union is an actual and real union, the donation and delivery of himself by the religious must be actual, and the acceptance of it by the religious order must correspond. The acceptance must be actual.
A simple and a solemn vow are one in the essential idea of a vow. Every vow, whether simple or solemn, induces an obligation of religion, in virtue of the promise which has thereby been made to God. Transgression of either a simple or a solemn vow is essentially of the same kind of wickedness.
A solemn vow differs from a simple vow, inasmuch as a solemn vow adds and includes something which a simple vow does not include. A vow is simple, and is so called, as it simply includes the essential idea of a vow. It does not
Constitution of the Religious State. 3 1
have attached to it that peculiar solemnity which a solemn vow adds, over and above the essential idea of a vow. That which a solemn vow adds does not effect an essen tial difference between it and a simple vow. It does not constitute a new species of vow. It is something which accidentally perfects the vow. It formally constitutes the vow in its special character as it is a solemn vow.
A vow may be substantially solemn, even when it is made without any external and accidental solemnity. All that is required is that there should be present two per sons, one person who, along with the substantial vows of religion, which are made to God, makes a donation and delivery of himself, and another person, who is invested with power to accept and who accepts those vows and that donation in the name of the Church of God.
A vow, on the other hand, may be externally solemn, that is to say, the vow may have been made with certain rites and external ceremonies, and nevertheless, that vow may not possess substantial solemnity.
Vows which are substantially solemn are not essential in order to constitute the religious state.
A vow is called solemn, as a testament, or a contract, or an oath is called solemn, to which that form, or public solemnity, is attached which law requires. Solemnity is a form, or complexus of formalities, which public authority adds to an act. It does so in order that this act should be placed under the special guardianship of the whole body of the commonwealth. That, therefore, is solemn, which has force not merely from the action of a private agent, but also from public authority. This authority may intervene, either through a public person, or through certain rites and ceremonies, such as are not necessary by natural law in order to the validity of the act. The act will thus be taken and placed under a singular guardianship of the whole body of the commonwealth, inasmuch as the commonwealth took part in the doing of that act. In a solemn act, therefore, there
32 Elements of Religious J.ife.
intervenes the confirmation of the public authority, which thereby takes that act under its own special guardianship. The solemnity of vows consists in — a mode which has to be observed, in order that the Church of God should with her divine authority confirm those vows.
If this mode should not be observed — or if the Church should in any way protest that she is not confirming the vows with her authority, or that she does not receive them as solemn vows — they will then be simple vows only, and not solemn vows.
The solemnity of vows was originated by institution of the Church, just as the solemnity of contracts, of testaments, and of oaths, was originated by institution of the civil authority.
That there should be certain effects of vows — and that these effects should be that which they are — is entirely within the discretion of the Church. Hence certain effects of a solemn vow might be given by the Church to a simple vow, without its ceasing to be a simple vow. Certain effects of a solemn vow might, on the other hand, be restrained by the Church, while that vow should nevertheless remain a solemn vow.
The proper conception of the solemnity of vows is intervention of ecclesiastical authority, and confirmation of the vows by that authority, in the making of the vows. In virtue of this confirmation it is that the Universal Church takes those vows under its o\vn special guardianship.
It remains, nevertheless, proper to solemn religions profession to annul previous matrimonium rat inn — or marriage which has been con tracted, but which has not as yet been consummated — and also that in virtue of solemn profession the religious Order is reciprocally bound to the religious subject, to retain and support him for the rest of his life, unless in punishment of crime he has to be expelled as incorrigible.
Disabilities spring not from the solemnity of a vow in itself, but from special free decree of the Church which she has made with regard to certain determinate actions. See Ballerini. Opus Thcologicnm Morale, vol. ii, page 445.
4-
The donation and delivery of himself which a religious makes to his Order is entirely distinct from his vow of chastity. His vow of chastitv in itself is not a donation,
Constitution of the Religious State. 33
but is a promise which he has made to God alone. The donation and the vow are distinct one from the other not only in idea, but in reality. The donation has for its object and its matter not the man's body, in order to the obser vance of chastity — but the man himself m order to service and subjection. The donation and the vow are mutually separable. The donation might be made by itself apart from any vow of chastity. A vow of chastity might be made, and that even in the hands of a superior, apart from any donation of oneself. Those two things, which are really distinct, are nowadays made together in religious profession, and are morally conjoined in order to religious profession. The act of promising a thing, and the act of delivering the thing which has been promised, are not in themselves or necessarily conjoined. The two acts may be separated at will. We often give that which we have never promised. It is possible for us to promise that which we do not give, or which we do not immediately give. A promise has regard to the future. Delivery exists in the present.
Even if a man should promise his goods to God for His service, with a deliberate intention of delivering them to God then and there, he nevertheless, so long as he has not handed them over to God's Church, or to God's poor, or expended them on other pious works, has not renounced his own dominion over them, or his ownership of them. God does not by Himself immediately accept any donation which is made to Him, and by an unaccepted donation God does not acquire any special right and dominion over and above that general right and dominion, or ownership, which belongs to Him as He is the one Creator. In accepting, God employs the intervention of
34 Elements of Religious Life.
second causes, such as are His ministers. His ministers are the administrators of His goods, and it is for them to accept and use these for Him.
That which is in this matter true of external goods is true also of a man's own body. Even if a man should have an internal purpose of delivering his body to God for His special service, he will not thereby lose his dominion or right of ownership over his body. He will not have imposed on himself a new obligation with regard to the observance of chastity, which he has not vowed. A good purpose does not of itself induce obligation.
A promise is, as it were, a particular law which a man imposes on himself. A promise can therefore be made immediately to God. The promise has its effect im mediately on the person who makes it, and whom therefore it specially binds to the service of God.
A donation, on the other hand, does not of itself and immediately bind the giver. It is not in him, but in the person to whom it is made, that a donation produces its own proper effect. To that person it transfers the dominion or ownership of the thing given. The giver is by means of his donation deprived of his ownership. He is consequently bound henceforth not to act to the prejudice of his donation.
A solemn vow of chastity has always attached to it a donation and delivery which is made to God, not im mediately, but through the intervention of God's ministers, by whom also it is that this donation is accepted. That which is thus delivered to God remains under the care and irovernment of God's ministers, and by means of the delivery of it to them they acquire for God a new right to it. Delivery is required in order to the solemnity of a vow
Constitution of the Religious State. 35
of chastity, but delivery is not of itself sufficient to render a vow of chastity solemn.
The power of entering on the married state is in such wise natural, and given for the common good of all man kind, that although a man may, by an act of his own will alone, bind himself to God not to use this power, he never theless cannot wholly deprive himself of the power itself. He cannot, by his own private authority alone, and apart from intervention si public authority, disable or render him self incapable of matrimony. The right to marry is more a public right of all mankind than it is a private right of any human individual, since it is ordained for the preserva tion of the species.
A solemn vow of religious chastity perpetually disables him who makes it from contracting valid matrimony. This disabling efficacy is to be attributed to the vow rather than to the do?iation. Prohibition to marry follows not from the donation, but from the vow, and therefore so does also the invalidation of the matrimony.
The same vow, remaining in itself unchanged, may be come from being a solemn vow to being a simple vow — or from being a simple vow to be a solemn vow. It may be come so independently of the will of the man who made the vow. Solemnity depends on intervention of a law of the Church. This law does not, as regards its duration, its abrogation, or its effect, depend on the will or intention of the man who makes a vo\v.
A change of simple vows into solemn vows might take place, for instance, in the c;ise of the simple vows of scholastics in the Society of Jesus. In the beginning Of
3 6 Elements of Religions Life.
the Society these vows were simple on two grounds. They were simple, in the first place, because they did not render those who made them incapable of matri mony. They were simple, secondly, because they were not annexed to a donation and delivery which was absolutely perpetual and indissoluble on both sides. The donation and delivery of themselves was perpetual and indissoluble only on the side of the religious who made it. Power remained with the Society to dissolve the bond and to dismiss the religious for just causes.
As regards the first ground of simplicity in these vows it has been so far diminished. The vows of scholastics of the Society now render them incapable of contracting rahd matrimony, so long as these vows endure. This they do in virtue of the Bull of Pope Gregory XIII., Ascendente Domino, which, as soon as uttered, had effect not only on those who should thereafter make such vows, but also on those religious who had previously to that date been free from this matrimonial impediment. This is manifest from the tenor of the Bull.
As regards the second ground of the simplicity of these vows, it also might at any time be taken away by means of a law of the Sovereign Pontiff which should deprive the Society of Jesus of its power of dismissing scholastics. The Pontiff has, most certainly, power to do this. The vows of scholastics are in themselves perpetual, and the donation to which they are annexed is, so far as the religious are concerned, irrevocable. The Pontift might therefore make the acceptance of the donation by the Society irrevocable, in virtue of his power, as he is its supreme pastor and legislator. There would then be completed in the scholastics' vow of chastity the idea of a solemn vow. That vow would then possess
Constitution of tlic Religions State. 37
all the necessary conditions which a solemn vow de mands.
In the same way, on the other hand, if the Pontiff were to give power to a religious Order to dismiss those who were already solemnly professed, and to dismiss them free from the bond of profession, and from all their vows, the vows which had previously been solemn would thereupon cease to be solemn. They would be no longer solemn, since, from the date of the Pontiff's decree, they would not be absolutely perpetual, — but perpetual only under condition.
6.
A vow of poverty is simple, when there is merely made to God a promise of observance of poverty by abdication of dominion or ownership of all temporal goods, and of the use of goods as if they were one's own property.
A simple and a solemn vow of poverty are one in the essential idea of a vow. A simple vow might, however, be partial only, that is to say, it might concern some and not all temporal goods. A solemn vow of poverty must be entire, that is to say, it must be a vow not to possess any thing whatsoever as property, whether as regards owner ship, or as regards usufruct, or even as regards the use of it as if it were one's own.
Simple and solemn vows of poverty are distinguished from each other by their effects, just as simple and solemn vows of chastity are so distinguished.
A solemn vow of poverty not only binds a man not to possess temporal goods as his own property, but it also disables him, and renders him perpetually incapable of owner ship and dominion. A solemn vow consequently renders
3 8 Elements of Religious Life.
him incapable of entering on any inheritance whatsoever. As soon as a solemn vow is taken, it by its own force and ipso facto excludes ownership of those goods which he previously possessed.
This disability must be perpetual, absolutely and morally, in virtue of the state entered on through solemn religious profession. A simple vow of poverty which should produce these disabling effects only so long as it lasts, does not induce an absolutely perpetual incapacity. A vow is solemn, not because the vow has disabling effects, but because it has power to produce them.
A solemn vow has its disabling force not from natural law, nor from divine law, nor as it is a vow, nor even from the donation to which it is annexed, but from institution of the Church.
7-
A peculiar moral effect which distinguishes a solemn vow of obedience from a simple vow of obedience is that a solemn vow of obedience so subjects the will of the religious to his superior that, without the superior's consent, the will of the religious subject is inefficacious to the con tracting of any civil or natural obligation, whether by way of contract, or in any other way.
A simple vow of obedience does not produce this effect. It only induces the obligation of a promise to obey the superior. This is not sufficient to invalidate a man's bind ing himself to another man in matters which are not to the prejudice of his vow, or at variance with his Rule, or with the rights of his Order. A vow of obedience does not of itself bind a man not to make any promise with regard to a lawful matter which is not forbidden either by the Rule or by the superior. Such a promise will be valid.
Constitution of the Religious State. 39
The effect of invalidation therefore springs from the solemnity which is added to the vow. The force and •efficacy to invalidate, which is annexed to the vow, con stitutes and is its solemnity.
A simple promise of obedience does not of itself induce so great a subjection and dependence on the part of the re ligious, nor does it give so great a power to him to whom obedience is promised. A simple promise of obedience gives to the superior the power only of prescribing, and it imposes on his subject the obligation only of obeying in those things which have been prescribed within the limits of the matter of his vow. Power in a superior to in validate every obligation of his religious subject is not of itself annexed to his power of prescribing. It does not therefore follow or flow from a simple vow of obedience. It belongs to a peculiar property from which a vow derives this efficacy. In this property consists the solemnity of a vow of obedience.
Power in superiors to invalidate the obligations of their subjects springs from the dominative power which they possess over them. This dominative power is not derived from the vow of obedience, which is not a donation but a promise. Dominative power is derived from the subject's donation and delivery of himself. This donation is specially conse crated to God by means of the vow. It is elevated so as to be a spiritual holocaust which is offered to God. The donation is moreover confirmed by the vow. The vow adds to the donation a special obligation of fidelity due to God. This the donation by itself does not induce. The addition of the vow to the donation is therefore not superfluous.
It is not possible for a man to deprive himself of his power to bind himseif in lawful matters, by depriving
40 Elements of Religious Life.
himself, at his own discretion and by his own private authority, of the dominion of his will through transference of it to another. For this there is required intervention of the public authority of ecclesiastical law.
In religious profession, the donation and delivery of him self by the religious is, as it were, the matter, while his vow is the form. The vow not only confirms the obliga tion of obedience but completes it, and specially conse crates it to God. To the vow therefore it is that there is specially attributed abnegation of the will, and disabling efficacy.
If all the substantial vows of religion, especially the vow of obedience, are perfectly observed, simple vows will not less exactly remove all hindrances to perfection than would solemn vows. If, on the other hand, the vows are not observed, those vows would not, even if they were solemn vows, contribute towards removal of hindrances to perfec tion.
8.
According to the present law and usage of the Church of God, it is not possible for a true religious state to exist, except in a religious body which has been approved by the Church.
The approbation of the Church includes two things. One of these belongs to the understanding, or to a judg ment of the understanding. The other is more properly an operation of the will. To approve a religious community in the first way is, after sufficient examination, to make an internal judgment, and externally and authoritatively to declare — that the mode of life of that community is holy— that it is free from all error and superstition — that in its end, and in the means which it proposes, it is a manner of life
Constitution of the Religions State. 41
which is tending towards perfection — and that therefore it is worthy of erection to the religious state.
By this approbation nothing is conferred on the In stitute. That which the Institute already possesses is simply made known.
To approve in the second way is efficaciously to create or erect a community into an ecclesiastical and truly religious state.
It is to this public and authoritative approbation, where by the new Order is proposed to the Universal Church as a system to be imitated or embraced and followed, that theologians refer when they say that the Sovereign Pontiff cannot err in his approving of a religious body. He cannot err in authoritatively declaring that its mode of life is good and holy, and that it is a fitting means towards the end of acquiring perfection.
This approbation is, as it were, a canonization, by which the Institute is publicly and authoritatively set forth as holy. The necessity for approbation does not arise from canon law alone. It is founded in the law of nature.
A religious body, with a mode of common life, cannot be instituted by means of the substantial vows of religion alone, without the addition of certain observances which give to that body its special character. In that which is added by merely human action peril of error is always imminent. To avoid this, the authoritative approbation of the Church is necessary.
If propagation of religious bodies were free to private individuals, many errors might easily be introduced, and the faithful might be deluded into embracing a mode of life which was either prejudicial to their salvation — or was a hindrance to their perfection — or at least was in no way a real means towards perfection.
42 Elements of Religions Life.
It so happened in the time of Innocent III. Certain heretics, who were called Poor Men of Lyons, or Walden- ses, invented a superstitious mode of life. They en deavoured also to introduce it as a religious state. Innocent III. therefore decreed that no religious Order should in future be erected without the approbation of the Sovereign Pontiff.
Approbation in some fashion was always, from the beginning of the Church of Christ, necessary in order to the introduction into that Church of a new religious body.
There are two ways in which a new religious body may be introduced into the Universal Church. One is when the religious body is from the first instituted for the Universal Church, so as to spread itself throughout the whole Church, preserving the unity of one body with a bond of union of its members under one head. This mode was not that of the more ancient Orders. It was a mode which obtained in later days and chiefly with the rise of the Mendicant Orders. Such an Order requires, of its own nature, the approbation of the Universal Church. The approbation of it belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff, to whom belongs the care of the Universal Church.
The older religious bodies, before the time of Innocent III., had another mode of origin and propagation. At the first they were not instituted generally for the Universal Church. They were not propagated by way of one corporate body under one head. A religious body began in one monastery, and to that one monastery it was not seldom confined. Sometimes monasteries were multiplied upon the same lines. In this case, although those monasteries did not properly form one religious body, they nevertheless
Constitution of the Religions State. 43
by reason of their oneness with regard to Rule, and by reason also of their emanation from one common parent, were held to form — one family.
In those days the approbation of a religious body was not universal from the first, nor did bestowal of approbation proceed immediately from the Sovereign Pontiff. The initia tion of a religious body belonged to the Bishop in whose diocese the first monastery of that body arose. If a similar monastery was to be erected in another diocese, the appro bation of this monastery belonged to the Bishop of that •diocese. This Bishop was not bound to follow the judg ment of the other Bishop. That Bishop was not his superior. The judgment of that Bishop was moreover not universal. Things went on in this way, until at last the approbation of the religious body became so general that that body was held as approved by at least the tacit consent of the Universal Church. This consent was completed by the ipso facto or tacit approval of the Sovereign Pontiff.
Besides speculative approbation — by which the usefulness and the excellence of a religious body is declared — there is also necessary, in order to the institution and erection of that body, a practical approbation. By this practical approbation there is given to a religious congregation, or to its superiors, power to accept in the name of Christ, and to constitute in a true religious state, those persons who offer themselves for profession of that manner of life which it embodies.
The power of approving religious bodies belongs, in its fulness, to the Sovereign Pontiff alone. It exists in a
44 Elements of Religious Life.
manner in the Bishops. Before the date of the Fourth Lateran Council, the Bishops had some share in the exer cise of this power. Monks were at that time subject to the Bishops as to their own proper superiors. They were subject to the Bishop not only in that general sense in which all persons who are dwelling within the diocese are subject to the Bishop, but in a special sense, and in that sense in which they are now subject to, for instance, their Provincial or their General. The Abbot was himself subject to the Bishop, as his monks were proximately subject to the Abbot, and mediately or remotely subject to the Bishop. To the Bishop the act of reception of monks belonged. Superiors, or even founders of religious bodies, could not accept monks on their own authority. To the Bishop, in like manner, there belonged the expulsion of incorrigible monks.
There are various distinctions between Pontifical appro bation and Episcopal approbation of religious bodies. In the first place, the approbation of the Sovereign Pontiff extends to the Universal Church. The approbation of a Bishop is confined within the limits of his own diocese. An Archbishop cannot approve a religious body for his province. He can approve it only for his own diocese. Outside his diocese an Archbishop has no ordinary jurisdiction.
Secondly, Episcopal approbation results in, at most, merely human certainty. It is, therefore, fallible. The approba tion of the Sovereign Pontiff is of divine authority, through special assistance of the Holy Ghost, lest he should err in so grave a matter. The Pontiff's approbation has therefore infallible certainty. This special privilege of the Pontiff cannot be delegated, any more than the Pontiff can delegate
Constitution of the Religioiis State. 45
his power of canonizing saints, or of defining Catholic doctrine.
Thirdly, this power of approbation of religious bodies exists in the Sovereign Pontiff immediately of divine right. It does not so exist in the Bishops. Even if it did, it would exist in them with dependence on the Pontiff.
Fourthly, this power of approbation of religious orders, which exists in the Pontiff, is independent of any man or men. It depends on no one save on Christ, his only master. It cannot therefore be either taken away, or diminished, or limited. So far as this power may exist in the Bishops, it can be limited, or even taken away, as was in fact done in the Lateran Council. The Pontiff therein reserved to him self the approbation of religious bodies.
Fifthly, the Pontiff can, in approving a religious body, solemnize its vows. A Bishop cannot solemnize vows. Consequently a Bishop can only approve a religious body as constituted by simple vows.
Finally, the Pontiff alone has power absolutely to approve a religious body. Bishops can do so only relatively, or partially. Their approbation is limited, it is fallible, and it is revocable.
- Besides the Regular Orders there exist at the present day Religious Congregations, both of men- and women, which have grown up with the greatest profit not only to the whole of Christendom, but to the civil commonwealth. Of these Congregations some are diocesan, while some are not. Those Congregations are diocesan, which have one or more houses in one diocese, and which have the intention of existence within the limits of that diocese. Those Congregations are not diocesan which — although they are not exempt — are under the obedience of one general superior or superioress, and are spread abroad throughout several dioceses. The men or women who com pose such Congregations make simple vows of poverty, chastity and obedience, either in perpetuity or for a time. By their vow of poverty
46 Elements of Religious Life.
they are not disabled with regard to the retaining of the radical ownership of their property, or witli regard to acquiring and disposing of goods, although the administration and use of them, and the demanding of the fruits of them, is entirely forbidden. The utmost freedom is granted to religious under simple vows to grant the adminis tration and usufruct of their goods to, or in favour of, their parents, if it shall so please them, or, if they prefer it, to their own Order. The reason is because the community or Institute does not through simple profession acquire any right to the goods of its subjects. Since religious under simple vows can acquire goods by inheritance, they ought to commit the administration, usufruct and use of them to some person of their choice, if they have not committed it to their own Congregation. Religious sisters require the written leave of the Bishop before they can dispose of the ownership of their goods, and this to secure prudence in so doing ; but any covenants made by way of contract between a professed Sister and her Congregation, are not left to the judgment of their ecclesiastical superior.
With regard to the approbation of those Congregations, the petition for approbation of the Institute usually coincides with the petition for confirmation of the Constitutions. The distinction between Rules and Constitutions is not admitted in the case of those new Institutes. Under the name of Rules, there come only the Rules of the ancient Orders which were in old times approved by the Apostolic See.
\Vith regard to merely diocesan Institutes, the Apostolic See is not wont to approve either them or their Constitutions, but leaves the approbation of them to the Bishop. With regard to Institutes which intend to settle in other dioceses, they must have recourse for appro bation to Propaganda, in the case of missionary countries, and, in the case of other countries, to the Congregation of Bishops and Regulars.
In order to obtain approbation there must be procured, in the first place, letters from the Bishop in whose diocese the Institute, or its principal house is situated ; and, if the Institute is to be spread abroad in other dioceses, letters must be procured from the several Ordinaries. In these letters there ought to be set forth (i) when and by whom the Institute was founded, whether it has obtained any Decree of prai-c from the Apostolic See, and how many houses there are. It ought also to be set forth how many men or women have been professed, when the Constitutions were framed, what is the progress which the new founda tion has made, what is its present state, and what are its temporal
Constitution of tJie Kcligions State. 47
resources. There is required (2) the consent of all the religious, or of all the nuns, given in Chapter ; (3) and proof by experience of the usefulness of the Constitutions.
Ordinarily, before the Constitutions are approved, there is given a Decree of praise, and this is not always of the same import. Some times there is praised only the scope and end of the Institute, and this is wont to be done when some defect is apprehended in the mode of government or in the Constitutions. Sometimes both the scope and the Institute are praised, and not seldom simply the Institute. Some times the Institute is approved, while the Constitutions are simply praised. Sometimes there is granted a Decree of praise and at the same time of approbation, that is, when as the result of experience the usefulness of the Constitutions has been recognized. If there has hitherto been no trial of these by experience, a fitting time is fixed for this, and very often certain modifications of the Constitutions are pro posed. At the end of that time the Constitutions are again submitted to examination until at length they are definitely approved. See Zitelli, Apparatus Juris Ecclcsiastici, pp. 240-243.
With regard to jurisdiction — as necessary in order to the existence of the religious state — there are three ways in which jurisdiction may be conceived as required — (i) for the institution of a religious body ; (2) for the constitution of the members of that body in the religious state ; (3) for the government of the religious body.
(i) For the institution of a religious body jurisdiction is most certainly required. It is then that a religious body is instituted when that body is approved and confirmed.
There must necessarily be in the first place the founding and the ordering of the Institute on which approbation is to fall. This is nevertheless only a preparation and a dis position of the matter. For this jurisdiction is not neces sary. There is in preparation or disposition no question of right or law, nor any exercise of the action of a superior.
48 Elements of Religions Life.
Approbation is, on the other hand, the as it were forma tion of the matter which has been thus disposed to receive a form. Approbation is, therefore, the effecting or the creation of the religious body.
(2) Jurisdiction is also necessary for the accepting of the vows or profession of the religious. Acceptance would not be valid if it were not made by one who had the necessary power.
(3) The question however principally is, as to whether in a religious body there is required the peculiar jurisdiction which belongs to a superior over his subjects, in order that the members of that body may be true religious. To deter mine this question we must first clearly understand what is meant both \>y jurisdiction and by dominative power.
By jurisdiction is signified a spiritual power which belongs to the Keys of the Church, and which is derived from Christ through the Vicar of Christ.
By dominative power is signified a right which has been acquired by a religious body, and by its superiors, to govern the religious members of that body. This power does not belong to the Keys. It does not descend from Christ through any special donation made by Him to His Church. It is a power which springs radically from the wills of those who profess [the Rule, and who give themselves to the re ligious body, with a promise and bond of obligation of obedience to its superiors according to the Rule. This power, as it is distinct from the power of the Keys, is dis tinct from jurisdiction, properly so-called.
In a religious body it is necessary that there should exist in its superior a power of government of his monastery, which is in its measure dominative over the individual re ligious, and which is distinct from power of jurisdiction,
Constitution of the Religious State. 49
and is separable from jurisdiction, properly so-called.
The religious state is a state of bondage, which is distinct from the state of subjection in which, in virtue of ecclesias tical jurisdiction, all the faithful are living. To this special bondage there corresponds a peculiar dominative power^ which is distinct and separable from proper power of juris diction.
This dominative and, so to speak, domestic or economic power, which exists in the Abbot, in the Prior, or in any- other proper and immediate Superior, is, apart from juris diction, sufficient to constitute a true religious state. This is evident from the case of Nuns. An Abbess does not possess jurisdiction. The Nuns are nevertheless subjected to her, as to a mother, and they are bound to obey her in accordance with the Rule which they have professed. Her power and their subjection suffice to constitute the com munities of religious women to which they belong true religious bodies.
In virtue of this paternal, or maternal, power, which is derived from voluntary compact — along with lawfully accep ted delivery of themselves by the religious, which has been confirmed by the vow of obedience — a religious superior possesses, apart from proper jurisdiction, power to prescribe to his subjects, to coerce them, and to punish them, with a moderate and duly regulated punishment, or such a punish ment as should suffice in order to the ordinary government of a well-regulated family.
In order, however, to the perfect government of a religious body, proper power of jurisdiction is required, and jurisdic tion must exist in some superior of that body. This juris diction must be at least extrinsic, and such as is brought to
D
5O Elements of Religious Life.
bear upon the rest of the faithful. The spiritual jurisdiction which is necessary for the government of the Universal Church is necessary for the government of all ecclesias tical states which that Church comprehends. A special subjection to the spiritual jurisdiction of the Church follows as a natural consequence of the institution of any religious body. Although communities of Nuns do not have among themselves any superior who possesses jurisdiction, those nuns have nevertheless, and always, a superior who has proper jurisdiction over the whole body of them including the abbess. This superior is the Bishop, in the case of com munities which are subject to him. In the case of com munities which are exempt from his jurisdiction, it is the provincial or other superior of the same order of men, of which the community of nuns is a member.
In the early ages, before the exemption of religious> monasteries of monks were subject to the Bishop, who possessed and exercised jurisdiction over them. From the date of their exemption, they are subject to the Sovereign Pontiff, or to superiors of their own Order, to whom the Pontiff has communicated his jurisdiction. The religious state has, therefore, never existed apart from jurisdiction.
As in a civil commonwealth no family, or private society, or other civil state can exist without subjection to a civil ruler who has proper jurisdiction over it, so is it also in that spiritual commonwealth which is the Universal Church.
Merely private or paternal power would not suffice in order to the good government of a religious community, or of its members. It is sometimes necessary to use censures to coerce men, as well as other punishments which are graver than are those which can be inflicted by paternal power alone.
Subjection of religious to jurisdiction, properly so-called.
Constitution of the Religious State. 5 1
is not a condition which is necessary in order to constitute the religious state. It is a property which is a consequence of that state. It follows in the same way as from the ordination of a cleric there follows the subjection of that cleric to a superior who possesses spiritual jurisdiction. This subjection, or the jurisdiction which is the correlative of it, is not a condition which is necessary in order to the clericate. It is a property which is consequent upon the clericate.
The two powers, both jurisdiction and the dominative or paternal power which springs from religious profession, may exist united in the same person. A Bishop, for instance, has power to prescribe in virtue of obedience to Nuns who are not exempt from his jurisdiction, and who are there fore subject to him, as he is himself the Superior of their convent. He can, at the same time, and as he is their Bishop, add to his precept a censure.
10.
The state of perfection, simply and absolutely, and as it includes all that is of the substantial perfection of that state, is proper to the law of grace. Before the time of the law of grace the state of perfection was only fore shadowed, or in part inaugurated. It was not perfected. With regard to three points we have certainty — (i) that the religious state is not of purely human institution, but that, on the contrary, it derives its origin from divine law; (2) that the religious state has been preserved by a continuous and uninterrupted tradition in the Church of Christ ; and (3) that in its essence the religious state has always been the same.
Besides instituting the religious state, so far as regards
52 Elements of Religions Life.
the substance of that state, Jesus Christ instituted also one particular religious body. This he did by congregating certain men, and by delivering to them a proper and particular mode of religious life. He called His Apostles to embrace a true and proper religious state. They truly and properly made the three vows of poverty, of chastity, and of obedience, and that as belonging to the state of perfection. Since Christ called His Apostles in order that by means of them He might sow the seeds of all virtue and perfection throughout the world, it cannot be doubted that He constituted them in that state in which they might be to all men examples of perfection.
A special Rule was not necessary in the case of the Apostles. So long as Christ Himself was with them, He was to them their living Rule. After He was gone they could not have been hampered with the restrictions of a special ceremonial Rule, since they were to be dispersed throughout the whole world. Of such a Rule they did not stand in need. They were themselves most perfect. They were also assisted and directed by the Holy Ghost. They were acting moreover under the living influence of Peter.
The religious state has always continued in the Church from the time of its institution by Jesus Christ. This is the common doctrine of the Fathers. Pius IV., in a Bull in favour of the Clerks Regular of St. Augustine, speaks of regular clerks as instituted by the Apostles. This order was restored and renewed, but was not begun by St. Augustine. St. Anthony did not institute, but found many monasteries already in existence. These he brought to perfection. The monasticism of the fourth century is so notorious that even heretics do not deny the existence of it.
Constitution of the Religious State. 53
By means of simple vows a man may at the present day be con stituted a true religious, and an Institute in which simple vows alone are made, cannot be denied to have the dignity of a religious state. By authority, however, of the Apostolic See, there is this difference, that that Institute alone is to be reckoned and called absolutely an Order — a true Order — a Religious Order — a Regular Order — or an Order to which the privileges of a Regular Order belong — in which solemn vows are made, if not. by all, at least by some of the members of the Order — as in the case of the Society of Jesus, in which solemn vows are made by the Professed Fathers only, and not by either the Approved Scholastics, or the Formed Coadjutors, although both are in virtue of their simple vows true religious. To other Institutes there is left the name of Institute — Society — Pious and religious, but secular Congregation— subject to the authority of the Bishop, like the rest of the secular clergy. If, however, as is frequently the case, the Roman See, or the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars has approved such Institutes and their Rules, and their manner of life, they are, so far as these are concerned, exempt from the jurisdiction of the Bishop. See Ballerini, Opus Theologicum Morale, vol. iv. p. 17.
CHAPTER III. Entrance into Religion.
IT is not forbidden by any law to enter into religion at any age. Age may be divided into three periods — (i) that of adults after puberty ; (2) that of children before the years of puberty, who have arrived at such use of reason as would be sufficient for the commission of mortal sin, and consequently sufficient for the making of a vow ; (3) that of infancy, or the age before use of reason.
Looking merely to natural law, it is lawful at any age freely to offer oneself to the perpetual service of God. There is no natural principle by which should be fixed any certain age for such an act. After a person has attained to freedom of will, there is no more reason for the selection of one age than there is for the selection of another age. There is so far no distinction between the ages before and after puberty, since all do not come at the same time to the same perfection in discretion and use of reason. That extent of age alone is required which is sufficient for perfect deliberation. Deliberation is neces sary in order that the act should be a human act, or such an act as becomes a human being. Looking to divine positive law, we do not find any law laid down by Christ to forbid this most excellent act before any age. We do not find any trace of prohibition in the Sacred Scriptures, in the decrees of Pontiffs or Councils, or in the tradition of the Fathers.
Looking to the words and example of Christ Himself,
Entrance into Religion. 55
we find that the very opposite of any such prohibition is in accordance with His intention.
The Council of Trent ordains that no one should be admitted to profession before the age of sixteen years complete. The Council does not forbid entrance before the age of fifteen. One may enter at any earlier age so long as profession is not made until the age of sixteen.
Clement III. ordained that lay brothers should not be admitted to the noviceship before the age of twenty. In the case of Nuns the Council of Trent forbids the entrance of girls before the age of twelve years complete, that is, before puberty. A Decree of the Sacred Con gregation of Bishops and Regulars, May 23, 1659, declares that girls are not to receive the religious habit before completion of their fifteenth year. For those under that age an Apostolic Indult may be applied for. See Ballerini, Opus Theologicum Morale, vol. iv. p. 28.
By a decree of Pius IX., promulgated by Encyclical Letters to the Superiors of Religious Orders on March 19, 1857, it was ordained that all religious of those Orders in which solemn vows are taken, should for the future take simple vows only at the end of their noviceship, and that they should not take solemn vows until after the lapse of at least three years, when they might be admitted to solemn vows, if then found worthy by their superiors. For just causes their solemn profession might be even longer delayed, although not beyond the age of twenty-five years complete. These simple vows are per petual on the part of him who makes them, and dispensation of them is reserved to the Sovereign Pontiff. They are dissolved, however, by dismissal from the Order. The religious under simple vows are sharers in all the graces and privileges which the solemnly professed of the same Order enjoy. That which Gregory XIII. in his Bull Ascendente Domino defined with regard to the scholastics of the Society of Jesus, namely, that they are true religious, although they have taken only simple vows, applies also to those religious of other Orders who, in accordance with this ordinance of Pius IX., remain for some years under simple vows only, before they make solemn profession. See Gury, Ed. Ballerini, 1869, vol. ii. pp. 74, 75.
Parents may lawfully offer their children to a religious
56 Elements of Religious Life.
Order, to be educated, and thereafter perpetually to per severe therein, so far as the parents are concerned. The parent has right and dominion over his child, and can dispose of him to any use which does not involve injustice, or other evil. Much more can a parent dispose of his child to a use which is for God's greater service and for the child's greater benefit.
Parental oblation of a child to a religious Order pro duces three effects — (i) that the child can be lawfully received and retained by the Order ; (2) that the father can no longer exercise his power of recalling his child, since he has renounced his right, and has, so far as he is concerned, made a donation of his child, and that donation has been accepted; (3) the child cannot, of his own will, leave the order before the age of puberty, since before that age he is ruled not by his own will, but by the will of his father. He may, however, be expelled, since the Order has not bound itself to retain him.
If the child consents to his parents' offering of him, there is no difficulty. He is then not only offered by his parent, but he offers himself. A child cannot, however, be compelled to enter a religious Order so as to be bound to profession therein, since to this not even an adult can be bound without his own consent and desire.
" To educate youth was one of the objects which St. Benedict had in view, when he founded his Order. He makes provision for this in his Rule. The reception of a child in those days was almost as solemn as a profession in our own. His parents carried him to church. Whilst they wrapped his hand, which held the petition, in the sacred linen of the altar, they promised, in the presence of God and of His Saints, stability in his name. " Little beings of three or four or five years old were brought in the arms of those who gave them life, to accept at their bidding the course in which that life was to run. They were brought into the sanctuary, spoke by the mouth of their parents, as at
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the font, put out their tiny hand for the sacred corporal to be wrapped round it, received the cowl, and took their place as monks in the monastic community." (Benedictine Centttrits, Atlantis, 1859, p. 19). The children's training was in keeping with the holiness of their consecration. They were confided to the care of a large-hearted and God-fearing man. The one object was to fill their souls with God, to teach them the power of knowledge, and the force of love, to educate the intellect, and to purify the heart. It was in this way, as offered by his parents at Monte Cassino, that St. Thomas Aquinas entered on his ecclesiastical career. — See The Life of St. Thomas of Aquin, by Roger Bede Vaughan, O.S.B., vol. i. p. 18.
2.
Both sexes are capable of religious life. A woman is, however, incapable of entrance into religious life in a monastery of men. A man is equally incapable of entrance into religious life in a monastery of women.
Hindrances to entrance into the religious state may- arise either from the nature of the case, and apart from any special positive law, or from positive law only. A man who is incapable of profession is equally incapable of entrance. He who is incapable of leading the religious life is not capable of probation for profession of that life.
The first impediment which renders a man incapable of entrance on the religious state is absence of the use of reason, if it is perpetual. If it is temporary, it renders him incapable only so long as it continues.
A second impediment is the bond of consummated matrimony. This disables, not absolutely, but condi tionally, that is, unless the other party renounces his or her right, and gives leave. Entrance without such consent would be a manifest injury, since it would be an invasion of already existing and just rights. The leave given may,
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even after entrance, be recalled, since as yet no bond of obligation has been contracted to God, and there has been as yet no transference of the person's right of ownership in himself. The person who enters can, of his or her own will, come out before profession, and return to his or her consort, who will be bound to receive and to admit him or her, as the case may be, to matrimonial life. The one who has remained in the world has also power to recall the other, and that other will be bound to return to matri monial life. Each of the two is understood to be, for the year before profession, on probation, in order to ascertain whether their perpetual separation is expedient or not. The rights of both are therefore equal. If both man and wife should, of mutual consent, enter the reli gious state, and if one of them should not persevere in that state, he or she has power to recall the other. The probation of each of them is understood to be with depend ence on the probation of the other.
A third impediment to entrance into a religious Order is profession already made in another religious Order. Reception into another Order would be directly subversive of the donation and delivery of himself, which was made by the religious in his first profession.
This impediment is limited, however, to the case of entrance either into a less strict Order, or into an Order profession in which, and consequently entrance into which from another Order, has been invalidated by special declaration of the Sovereign Pontiff.
A fourth impediment to entrance into the religious state is episcopal dignity. This impediment also is not absolute but conditional, namely, that entrance should not be made without leave of the Sovereign Pontiff.
Besides these impediments there is no other general
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impediment which invalidates entrance into the religious state. In the case of certain Orders, however, particular laws exist in virtue of which some other impediments invalidate entrance. In some Orders there is the impedi ment of descent from Jews or Pagans ; in others, illegitimate birth, or infamy, or the irregularity which arises from voluntary homicide, and the like.
It has to be ascertained whether the words of such Constitutions are merely prohibitory, or whether they also invalidate. If they invalidate, it has farther to be ascer tained whether the invalidation falls immediately on pro fession alone, or directly and immediately on reception also. If invalidation falls on profession alone, the entrance will not be absolutely null. When the impediment has been removed by dispensation, the noviceship will be reckoned from the date of entrance, and not from the date of the dispensation. If, on the other hand, the in validation falls directly and immediately on reception as well as on profession, the entrance will be absolutely null. The noviceship will have to be begun over again, unless for this also a special dispensation has been obtained. Such a dispensation the Sovereign Pontiff alone has power to grant, since he alone has power to dispense in order to the validity of profession without an entire year of previous probation.
There are many impediments which, while they do not invalidate, render entrance into religion unlawful. These arise either from natural law, or from ecclesiastical com mon law, or from the private laws of particular religious Orders.
With regard to the question whether Parish priests and other clerics can go into religion without the consent of the Bishop, we have first to
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set aside certain cases. If a cleric, on account of his education having been paid for, or for other causes, has bound himself by bargain to serve a diocese for a certain time, it is not lawful for him, before he has fulfilled his bargain, on his own authority to go into religion. The reason is evident. That bargain was a most proper one, and a bargain which was for the advantage of the Church. The obligation to observe a bargain is matter of precept, and that prevails over counsel. It is proved also by the practice of the Colleges which the munificence of the Pontiffs has established in Rome. In these — and that by Pontifical law — promises to this effect are made and sworn to. These promises can not be departed from without express dispensation of the Pope. These oaths cannot be objected to on the ground that they hinder individuals from going into religion, as into that which is more perfect. The promises do not properly hinder entrance into religion. They only demand delay. Further, all things have to be weighed by the standard of their end, and the prosperity of the Church of Christ is, as a good which is both common and divine, to be preferred to other good things. The preservation of the Church itself, and of its efficacious energy, demands that the several dioceses should be furnished with their own clergy, and that a perennial supply of clergy should be certain. T< > this the arrangement in question contributes. This is a far greater good than is the good that this or that individual should go into religion, to the certain damage of the diocese by which he has been nourished, in a lack of necessary pastors and assistants. By these covenants there is promised, not a man's service of his church in perpetuity, but only his service for a certain time. This suffices in order that this church should not be left destitute of necessary clergy. If perpetual service were promised, and this became common practice, there would be hindered without cause the freedom of individuals to dedicate them selves to God in religion. While the convenience of existing churches was provided for, the Church and the Apostolic See would be deprived of labourers for the conversion of the heathen. Further, freedom to follow God's vocation to religious life must be safeguarded. It is the duty of Bishops to commend the evangelical counsels, and to promote religious Institutes. The Church must always have labourers at hand, by whom may be executed the charge of Christ, " Go, and teach all nations."
If the Church were to suffer grievous loss by a cleric's going into religion, the Bishop could hinder his going, and he could recall him
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after he had gone, even after profession. Apart from these cases, and therefore looking at the matter on its own merits, it is certain that clerics who are not Bishops, and even if these clerics have cure of souls, can without leave of their Bishop go into religion. This is not hindered by their promise of obedience to the Bishop. That promise was made in accordance with the canons, and the canons permit priests, who have cure of souls, to go into religion, even against the expressed will of the Bishop. Benedict XIV. declares not only that they are not to be hindered in their purpose, but that they are rather to be exhorted to, and strengthened in, theirperseverance. The reason is manifest. Since these priests have not bound themselves to the service of their par ticular church in perpetuity, they have right, as have others of the faithful, to enjoyment of a benefit which Christ has prepared for all men. Since they are living in a less perfect state, they have a right to pass to a more perfect state, so as to place in greater security the affair of their salvation.
Since clerics have power, even against the expressed will of the Bishop, to go into religion, it is not in itself necessary for them to ask his leave, and especially since there is no law which imposes this obligation. The reverence which is due to a Bishop, nevertheless, demands that, if it is possible, every cleric should inform his Bishop about his entrance and ask leave. If he is a priest who has cure of souls, the Bishop ought to be informed by him in good time, in order that he may supply his place. Since at the present day every man who goes into religion must bring letters-testimonial from his Ordinary, it cannot be that in practice the leave of the Ordinary should not in some way be asked. The faculty which is given to clerics of going into religion, avails for entrance even into those Congregations which make only simple, although perpetual, vows. The motive of the law is not solemnity of vows, but the perfection of the religious state. — See Ballerini, O^tts Thcologicum Morale, vol. iv. pp. 130-133.
3-
A son is bound not to leave his father in extreme necessity in order to become a religious. There are three kinds of necessity to be considered in connection with the obligations of charity, mercy, and almsgiving. Necessity may be either extreme, grievous, or common.
62 Elements of Religious Life.
There is extreme necessity when a man is in such peril of death that, unless he is relieved, his death is morally cer tain, or there is at least the greatest risk of its occurrence.
Necessity is grievous when life cannot be supported unless in great indigence, and with great difficulty, or with great degradation and loss of position, or by means of a drudgery which is foreign to one's quality and condition.
Necessity is called common^ when it lias become neces sary for a man to live sparingly, and not only without superfluities, but without those surroundings which befit his position, and this even if with due diligence and industry the man need not be in want of the necessaries of life.
With regard to common necessity, there can be no ques tion. A son is never bound by reason of common necessity to give up or to delay his entrance into religion. Such necessity of the parent is to be regarded as being morally nothing in comparison with the loss which the son would suffer by depriving himself of the state of perfection. As a son is not in rigour bound to relieve his father in common necessity, especially if by so doing he should himself suffer equal temporal inconvenience, still less is he bound to relieve his father at great spiritual cost to himself. If a father who is in merely common necessity should expressly command his son to relieve him, and to give up entrance into the religious state, his son will not be bound to obey him. A father has no power to impose on his son a pre cept which is more rigorous than is that which nature itself imposes. In matters, moreover, which concern the salva tion of the soul, a son is not bound to obey a father who, without sufficient cause, forbids an act which will be so much for the soul's advantage of his son, and to which the son believes himself to have been called by God.
It is to be remembered, however, that a father's necessity
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is to be weighed not only as that necessity is at present, but by the standard of that which may reasonably be dreaded as imminent or in the near future.
In the case of extreme necessity, it is equally certain that a son is bound not to leave his father, in order to become a religious. Two conditions are necessary in order to found this obligation. One condition is that the son will be able, by remaining in the world, to relieve the extreme necessity of his father, or that he should have a moral or probable hope of being thus able to relieve him. No one is bound either to the impossible, or to the doing of anything in vain. The second condition which is required in order that a son should be bound to remain in the world is, that the son should himself individually be necessary to his father in his extreme necessity. If there are other sons, or if the father's extreme necessity can be provided for in another way, the son who desires to do so may rightly enter religion.
In order to justify a son, however, it is not sufficient that others might possibly relieve his father. There must be a well-grounded hope or a moral certainty that they will actually relieve him. It is not to the point that the other sons may sin by refusing to relieve their father. The fact remains that the father is actually living in extreme necessity. This necessity a son is bound to see to, and that, if need be, till his father's death. The father's necessity is the root of the son's obligation. The duration of that necessity is consequently the root also of the duration of the son's obligation.
We are bound to relieve our neighbours who are in extreme necessity, so long as we ourselves are in possession of goods, and those goods are not necessary for ourselves
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in order to the preservation of our lives. We are, neverthe less, not bound, as a rule, to acquire goods for this purpose, nor are we bound by actual labour or toil to succour the extreme necessity of every neighbour. With regard to parents, however, there exists a special and a singular obligation, which arises from a special and singular title. We are bound to relieve our parents in their extreme necessity, not only by means of those goods which we pre sently possess, but also by acquiring goods for this purpose, even if this should be difficult, and should entail con siderable toil, and that for some length of time. This obligation extends also to necessary bodily service, and to dedicating, if need be, our exertions throughout our lives to the aid of our indigent parents.
This filial debt is due from a special title. From our parents it is that we derive whatsoever we are, as from the sources or causes of our human being. This does not apply in the case of other blood relations.
In the case of our neighbours, the relief of them in their extreme necessity is payment of a general debt of mercy. In the case of our parents it is in addition the payment of a special debt of piety. This debt is of much more rigorous obligation. The obligation is greater than is an ordinary- obligation of justice. Although piety is not properlyjustice, piety is nevertheless more perfect in the rigour of its obliga tion, and in the demands of the debt which it begets.
A son is not entitled to leave his father even in grievous necessity, when there is no other person to relieve him, and no other way in which he may be relieved, and when that son himself could do so by remaining in the world.
There is a greater obligation of a father to his son than there is of a son to his father. A son, as St. Thomas
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teaches, is not bound per se to support his father, but is bound only accidentally, and by reason of his father's extreme or grievous necessity. A father is bound, not accidentally butflerse, and in virtue of his paternal office, to support and educate his son. He is the principle and cause or author of his son's existence. Hence it is not only when a son is in necessity that his father cannot enter religion. He is bound absolutely not to abandon his charge of his son, unless he has made sufficient provision for him in all things necessary, and has secured by means of the intervention of other persons his education and proper supervision. This is a natural obligation which springs from a natural precept. It cannot, therefore, be set aside for any work or state which is not of precept. This is to be understood, however, as referring only to the time during which a son is still under. the charge of his father, and in actual subjection to him, and not to the time after the son's emancipation from paternal control. The father is then supposed to have sufficiently reared and educated his son, and to have fulfilled and to have been divested of his office as a father. His natural obligation is ended. It was not perpetual. It lasted only during the continuance of the state of his son's natural need of it.
In the case, however, of even an emancipated son who is in necessity, his father is bound with the same obligation as that which a son lies under by reason of his father's necessity. The bond between them is reciprocal. So also are the obligations which it induces.
It is certain that a brother is not bound to support and educate his brother, and this not even if that brother is his younger brother. He is not the author of his brother's being. There exists towards brothers no obligation of justice but •only an obligation of charity, although the obligation of
E
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charity is greater as regards brothers than it is as regards strangers, by reason of the greater connection between them.
Even a son who is already professed is bound to leave his monastery to succour his father who has fallen into extreme necessity. By religious profession there is not extinguished the natural obligation of a son towards his parents. His return for a time to the world to relieve them is not at variance with his religious profession, the obligation of which is suspended by the urgency of a law of nature. A precept of natural and divine law prevails in extreme necessity over every vow and bond, and vows ought not to be such as should hinder acts of justice. There is here no question of dispensation from his vows, since that is not necessary to the end in view. See Ballerini, Opus Theologicum Morale^ vol. iv. page 118.
4-
No man is entitled to enter into religion with injury to a third party, or to transgress a natural precept in order to do a work of counsel. No man, therefore, can enter into religion who is burdened with debts, which it is possible for him to pay by remaining in the world. Debts are of two kinds. Some debts are uncertain, and do not involve restitution to any ascertained person. Other debts are certain, and payment of them is due to some determinate individual.
Uncertain debts do not hinder a man's entrance into religion. If a man delivers his goods along with himself to a religious order, or if he expends them upon the poor, or devotes them to other pious uses, he satisfies his obliga tion. If a debt is certain, that is to say, if the debt is due to a known determinate individual or individuals, and the debtor is absolutely unable to pay it, either now or in the future, he is free at once to enter into religion. By his entrance he does no injury to his creditors. Their action
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against him would be in vain. It is rendered useless by reason of his indigence. If a man, however, although he has no present means of paying his debts, has hope of being able by and by to pay them, he is bound to wait for some time and to pay his debts before he enters into religion. With regard to the length of time, no general rule can be laid down. The matter must be determined in in dividual cases, according to the circumstances of them, and in accordance with that which would be the judgment of prudent men. A hope of being able to pay his debts must, however, if it is to bind a man not to enter into religion, amount to a moral certainty. A merely dubious hope would not induce the obligation of so great a burden as would be that of waiting for a great length of time. A man would not be bound to beg or to do drudgery which was unbecoming to him in his position in life, in order to pay his debts. When reduced to this as the only means, he will be reckoned as simply unable to pay.
A Constitution of Sixtus V. declares criminals or perso is who are justly suspected of grievous crimes to be per petually incapable of the religious state. He decrees that if they have been rashly admitted thereinto, both their entrance and their profession are null and void. The crimes to which he refers are such as homicide, theft, robbery, and similarly grievous crimes. Hidden crimes are not comprehended by this Constitution, Those who have committed them are not included as criminals, so far as the effect of it is concerned. A later Constitution of Clement VIII. has modified that of Sixtus V., but to this extent only that the profession of such persons, whether criminals or debtors to large amounts, should stand. The earlier Constitution remains in vigour so far as regards the
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unlawfulness of their reception, and the punishment of those who receive them.
There are three effects of crime which may in some way hinder entrance into religion. First, there is the obligation in conscience — and that of commutative justice — to restore in the case of loss through crime, and to make satisfaction for injuries. A second effect of crime is infamy. This does not, however, arise from hidden crimes. A third effect of crime is to leave the delinquent liable to punishment by the public authorities.
By a Decree of Pius IX. (January 25, 1848) it is ordained that no one should be admitted to the religious habit without letters- testimonial both from the Ordinary of the postulant's birthplace, and from the Ordinary of the place where he has lived for more than a year since he was fifteen years of age. This applies even to Congregations in which only simple vows are made, but not to Nuns, of whom there is no mention. There is not required by this decree the Bishop's leave, or consent, or approbation, but only his letters-testimonial. However much the Bishop may oppose the reception of the postulant, the religious Superior has power to admit him. The letters-testimonial, moreover, are required in order to the lawfulness, but not to the validity of admission. No one can therefore pretend nullity of pro fession on the ground that he was admitted without such letters- testimonial. (See Bouix, DC Jure Regularium, torn. i. pp. 552, 575. 2nded.) This new legislation does not affect the Society of Jesus, •which was exempted from it by the same Pontiff, on the petition of the Father General (Roothan), Jan. 28, 1850. The examination of postu lants, however, by the Society, which was formerly a matter of Rule, is now of true and strict law, the existence of this examination having been a condition or ground of the Pontiffs exemption.
5-
He who enters the religious state must, of the nature of the case, do so with full deliberation and sufficient know ledge. His knowledge must be not merely general and
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speculative, but particular and practical, and such as is arrived at by prudent judgment. It is not sufficient that the religious state should be judged by him to be in itself the best of states. With regard to this, deliberation is not necessary. It is evident from the end of that state. The religious state must be considered with special relation to this particular person, taking into account his powers and capabilities, and other both intrinsic and extrinsic con ditions. It is not true that everything which is best in itself is best for every individual.
Three things have principally to be kept in view. In the first place, counsel should be sought of good men, who are free from all human affection, and who are of sound judgment with regard to what constitutes and concerns holy and religious life, and, if possible, of men who have themselves had experience of religious life.
Secondly, the consultation should be prudent and mature, but not too long protracted. This is not neces sary. It is likely rather to hinder divine vocation, and it opens the way to many perils.
Thirdly, there should be taken into account not merely the person's own unaided powers, but along with these the divine assistance.
Desire for the religious state is itself, as a rule, from the Holy Ghost, and this desire is to be entertained as coming from Him. The Holy Ghost may, however, cause the desire of a thing the accomplishment of which He does not will. He sometimes instils the desire, as a means of merit, even if the desire is never to be fulfilled, and even if it is not expedient that it should be fulfilled. Hence even if it is morally clear to a religious Superio
;o Elements of Religious Life.
that a particular person has been moved by the Holy Ghost to ask for the religious habit, he will nevertheless rightly refuse him, if it is not expedient for the Order that he should be received. In like manner, even if a man may himself morally believe that he is moved by the Holy Ghost to ask for the religious habit, he may nevertheless hesitate and take counsel. The desire is given for this end chiefly that a man should deliberate, take counsel, and test his motives.
Sometimes there is such an affection towards the reli gious state, and such a desire of entrance into it, that this state is absolutely, or so far as the person in question is con cerned, desired — if it should prove to be expedient. This is what is strictly and properly called vocation. Sometimes, however, a man does not feel in himself this affection and desire, and nevertheless he has certain cogitations and internal movements of his soul, either with regard to the perils of the world — or with regard to the spiritual advan tages of the religious state — or with regard to his choice of a state of life in accordance with whatsoever may be judged to be best for him individually. In this case, although there may not be that which is commonly under stood as vocation by the Holy Ghost, there may neverthe less in reality be, on the part of the Holy Ghost, some beginning of vocation. This beginning suffices as a reason for taking counsel with regard to entrance, and this may result in an efficacious election made with mature judg ment. An extraordinary vocation of the Holy Ghost, such as should beget a desire which would of itself be efficacious without its being preceded by counsel and deliberation, is not always to be looked for.
In order rightly to enter into the religious state there
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must be an intention which is not only not bad, but good with a goodness which is in proportion with the end of entrance. To enter from weariness of misfortunes, or in order merely to avoid want, or loss of position, would not be in accordance or in proportion with the end of the religious state.
An occasion^ however, must be carefully distinguished from an intention. The two are distinguished from each other as is an occasion from a cause. A desire to enter the religious state is not seldom occasioned by some tempo ral motive or event, and nevertheless the end of entrance comes afterwards to be not this, but greater perfection in the divine service. It often happens that " vexation gives understanding," and that temporal affliction excites a man to think of eternal things and to think little of temporal things. In this way he, little by little, arrives at a determination to secure eternal things, and for the sake of them to leave all temporal things.
Deliberation, therefore, with regard to the religious state which has been occasioned by temporal annoyances, is not lightly to be disregarded. It is the more carefully to be transacted. It is rather a common way in which God excites men to follow after better things.
If, however, escape from temporal annoyances should remain in reality the one and only motive for leaving the world, it will not suffice as a reason for entrance into religion. There would in that case be no prompt will to aim at the perfection which is the proper end of the religious state, no alacrity to bear its burdens, and no con fidence in looking for and begging the necessary succours of divine grace. The man would either not persevere, or he would not make progress. Religious life would be to him not a sweet yoke, but a grievous burden.
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The counsels of perfection have been set before all men indis criminately by Christ. St. Thomas therefore affirms, speaking gene rally, that those who induce others towards religion not only do not sin, but merit great reward. He says that those alone sin who induce others in an undue way, that is to say, with violence, or simoniacally, or by means of lies. He denies that there is need for consultation, in order that a man should go into religion. It is in a matter which is doubtful that counsel is required. It is certain that entrance into religion is something better than that which is merely good. He who doubts this derogates from Christ, Who gave this counsel. It may certainly happen that a particular person should not be fit for the religious state, and is therefore not called by God thereto. For this very reason it is, says St. Thomas, that there is reserved a period of probation, during which novices have trial by actual experience of the difficulties of religious life.
Mere entrance into religion cannot be by itself a sin, and if at the present day proofs of vocation are wont to be sought before entrance, this is for an extrinsic reason. It is because it would be unbecoming, and would savour of lightness of character, that a man on com pletion of his noviceship should return to the world, while it would not be for the advantage of a religious Order to have to house and feed an unfit novice at its own expense. Further, there might rightly be fear of a novice, who had got through his noviceship somehow, not daring to leave, even if he did not feel himself to be fit for the life, and so making his profession.
A man would certainly sin who, having the intention not to be pro fessed, should nevertheless enter the noviceship. He would be doing an injury to the Order, deceiving it, and spending a whole year at its expense. If a man does not feel that he has a vocation, but neverthe less is serious in making his religious profession, and has a true will to satisfy his religious obligations, what is there that is lacking to his vocation, if his profession is of only the religions state without the clericate, as bound up therewith ? Christ's counsel of religion is set before all men, and, so long as a man has the will to fulfil the obliga tions of his state, in what way could he be sinning ?
It is not all who are called to the clericate, and so, if his religious state is also clerical, a man would be acting rashly who should embrace it without God's vocation to the clericate. Since, however, the religious state supplies very many and most abundant spiritual aids, the man,
Entrance info Religion. 73
if his will is firm to live religiously, as he ought, will not be exposing himself to grievous peril of losing his soul. If, on the other hand, a man, who does not feel himself to be called, makes religious profession without a will to lead a true religious life, he sins in the very act of his profession. With it he mingles deception, and he is establishing himself in a state in which he will probably make shipwreck of his eternal salvation.
It is certain that the two cases are not on the same level — that of the man who, without being called, goes into religion — and that of the man who, being called into religion, remains in the world. The latter deprives himself of very many spiritual aids and means, wherewith the former, on the other hand, abounds. It is not to be supposed that all, or that the greater number of bad religious had never been called. It is one thing to be called, and it is another to follow the calling, and con stantly to persevere therein by faithful co-operation with the direction of the divine grace.
The common and sufficient signs of true vocation to religious life are two in number. These are found when a man is fitted for the state, being endowed with those qualities which that state demands, and when at the same time, keeping steadfastly in view the end for which he was created, he in serious deliberation constantly finds that the religious state commends itself to him, and he forms a judgment that, with the aid of God, he will easily in that state attain his end. It is in this way that God is wont to call men to the ecclesiastical or to the religious state, by inspiring both inclination and trustful confidence, there being always supposed any special fitness which may be required.
A difference has been indicated between vocation to the religious state, simply as such, and vocation to the priesthood. Vocation there fore to a religious Order, which combines clerical with religious life, must be considered in the light of the rules which apply to both voca tions, as they exist in separation. Some internal disposition of fitness is demanded, and the existence of it is presupposed by the Church in those who are raised by her Bishops to the ecclesiastical dignity of clerical orders. The principal dispositions are holiness of life and sufficient knowledge. Between those two there is this difference. Knowledge can be ascertained by trial and demonstration, and it can easily be preserved and increased. It is with difficulty that there can be any real proof of holiness of life, which is an internal matter and,
74 Elements of Religious Life.
unless through continual exercise it is deeply rooted, it will most easily be lost amid the occasions of the world.
Since the Church is wont to promote those only who offer themselves spontaneously, and since the clerical state demands that those only should be promoted to it who are fitted for it, it is of the utmost im portance that a man who offers himself should know that he is fur nished with due dispositions. As regards knowledge, he can leave the question to the Bishop, and rest satisfied with his decision, since he has full power of examination, and it belongs to him to form a judgment with regard to sufficiency of knowledge. With regard to holiness of life, the Church takes external holiness as a sign of internal holiness, and presumes therefrom. This presumption, however, must yield to the truth, that is, to the cogency of facts. He, therefore, who is con scious that he has not the due moral dispositions, cannot acquiesce in the judgment of the Church in admitting him, since she would certainly reject him, if she knew him as he is.
Internal dispositions of holiness do not in themselves constitute a divine internal vocation. A man may be most holy, and yet at the same time not called to the clericate. Vocation, or calling by God, so far as God is concerned, is a counsel of the Divine providence which ordains individual creatures towards their several ends, and chooses a particular man to a certain special state, and provides for him the aids which belong thereto. If a man is to remain in the common state, it is sufficient that he should have no vocation to ^peculiar state. Observance of the precepts is prescribed to all men, and the state of a layman is permitted to all men, unless God should call any man to a higher life.
Vocation is a manifestation of this counsel through internal inspira tion, more or less efficacious. As a general rule this counsel is wont to manifest itself when a man, keeping carefully in view his last end, feels himself, not once and again but frequently, affected towards the clerical state and its functions, and finds consolation therein, and on continued consideration thinks that in that state he will easily attain to his salvation. Every one is conscious of a vocation which is really there, even if, perchance, he does not yet know that it is that which is called a divine vocation. God may speak internally to hearts which are not yet cleansed. As it is not that all the holy are called to the priesthood, so not seldom it is that those are called who by their own wickedness render themselves unworthy of their calling. Although
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they cannot follow their vocation while they remain unworthy, they are, nevertheless, bound to make themselves worthy, so that they may follow their vocation.
Not to follow a divine vocation is not at least a grievous sin, look ing to the matter in itself, and apart from the effects of it. Voca tion is not a precept, but a persuasion and affection, and the neces sary means of salvation are always at hand in every state of life, and for all men, so long as they are yet alive. To enter, on the other hand, with a positive unworthiness, on a state which demands worthiness, is an inordinateness which is anything but small, and is in itself a grievous sin. Many and various cases may occur, and with regard to them our ideas ought to be clear. A man may offer himself for the ecclesiastical state without any vocation, and this man may be either good or bad. A man, who has been really called, may not offer himself, and this man again may be either good or bad. If a man who has not been called comes, and he is bad and comes for a bad end, he certainly ex poses himself to some peril of his own salvation, and of being an occasion of the damnation of other men. He does so not merely by his coming unworthily, but because he cannot count upon the aids of the state on which he enters, and it is not likely that he will easily amend his life, but will naturally go from bad to worse.
If a man, on the other hand, enters on the clerical state who is a a man of good life, but nevertheless without any vocation — and this may happen if from fear of some fellow man, or from any similar motive, he has been, as it were, compelled to receive orders — he will not be in grievous peril either of losing his own soul or of damaging other souls. If he goes on living a good life, and this in his case ought not to be hard, he will be a priest who is more or less useful in many ways, and one who through his daily Mass will not fail to receive all necessary and befitting graces.
With regard to the man who has really been called to the ecclesiastical state, and who not only refuses to enter that state, but is at the same time a bad man, he will not, so long as he has not amended his life, be bound to offer himself to the ecclesiastical state. He will be bound only to amend his life. If, however, that man cannot with any solid reason hope to be able to lead a holy life in celibacy, even after he has repented of his past life, and even after he has repented of not having followed his vocation which, as we have seen, was not of precept, we can only say that, although, absolutely speaking, he was at one time
7 6 Elements of Religions Life.
really called, he is now no longer called. — See Ballerini, Opus Theo- logicum Morale, pp. 133, 173.
Not only must a man's intention be good, but his will to enter the religious state must be spontaneous and voluntary. Hence a man does not enter rightly who enters from fear or merely from filial reverence for his parents.
Before the Holy Ghost has begun to call a man to the religious state, it is rarely expedient to directly induce him to embrace that state. It is well, however, to excite and lead him towards fear of God and purity of conscience and avoidance of every peril of sin, and at the same time to set before him the advantages and excellence of the religious state.
The Council of Trent excommunicates both those who by force or fear compel women to enter religion, and those also who hinder them without just cause.
Paternal power cannot take away the right which sons and daugh ters have to make their own choice of a state of life and, if they will, to follow Christ's counsels. The duty, however, which filial piety- demands, ought not to be disregarded, and the leave of parents ought to he asked. If it is straightway refused, their children ought not at once to take their departure, but should wait for some little time till the parents have realised their obligation. If they can easily obtain the consent of their parents, they ought not to go away without the parental benediction. If, however, there should be danger of the parents unjustly hindering the fulfilment of their children's vocation, they may and ought to go without their parents' knowledge. To avoid scandals and useless contentions, regard is also to be had to the laws of the country which define the authority of fathers over their children. Parents have right to make some trial of the vocation of their children, before they enter the noviceship, lest they should be imprudently exposing themselves to rejection, with annoyance to their family, and the useless spending of a year. It is not, however, lawful for parents to insist, by way of trial, that their children should first
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taste the pleasures of the world. If by these they should happen to be affected, the parents would not have reason to conclude that there had not been a true vocation. There may be a true vocation which is wrongfully abandoned. See Ballerini, Opus Thcologicum Morale^ vol. iv. page 121.
By common custom of the Church, something is received by monasteries of Nuns for the fitting support of the reli gious. This is called the Nun's dowry, and with regard to it there may be a bargain. In this there is no simony. The money is taken not as the price of her profession, but only as the means of her support.
The Council of Trent, in order to provide for the liberty of the novice, forbids, under pain of anathema, parents, relations, or guardians under any pretext to give to the monastery, except for the novice's food and clothing during the noviceship, any of the novice's goods before profes sion, lest the novice should be hindered from going away through the monastery's being in possession of the whole or great part of his worldly substance.
6.
A man cannot enter a religious order unless he is received by that order. Entrance and reception are corre latives. They are counterparts in a human contract, which cannot be perfected except by mutual consent of the parties to that contract.
Two things are necessary in order to the act of recep tion, namely — power to receive subjects — and due exercise of that power.
Power to receive subjects is necessary, not only in order to the lawfulness, but in order also to the validity of their reception into the religious state. Without power of acting, nothing can be transacted. Without power of contracting, no contract can be valid.
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Power to receive candidates into the religious state exists primarily and principally in the Sovereign Pontiff. His Holiness, however, is not in the habit of directly or imme diately exercising this power. The power exists imme diately and proximately in every religious body which has been approved by the Apostolic See, and it so exists in such bodies alone. It is conferred by means of Apostolic approbation. It is intrinsically included therein. If a religious body had not power to receive members, it could not continue to exist. This power, which belongs to the religious body, is exercised by the head of that body, or by that superior who is designated by the Rule and Con stitutions, or custom of the Order, or by the Privileges which have been granted to it by the Apostolic See.
The form and mode of reception is determined, as regards both validity and lawfulness, in accordance with the Constitutions and Institutes of the various Orders.
Supposing a concurrence of all things which are neces sary, both on the part of the candidate and on the part of the Order, a superior who has power to receive subjects is bound by his office, and of charity, to receive a postulant into the Order, unless there should exist some reasonable cause to excuse him. The superior is bound as regards his own Order, which is thereby increased in its numbers, and which thereby so far fulfils its end. He is bound also as regards his neighbour. He would otherwise be without cause depriving his neighbour of a great benefit. This benefit, which is supplied not from his own goods but from the common goods of Christ and of Christ's Church, the superior is bound as a faithful dispenser to bestow upon the postulant.
This obligation might, however, for many causes not
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exist. The Order might, for instance, not possess a suffi ciency of temporal goods, and the support of a new religious would be a grievous burden. In case of doubt with regard to the expediency of admission, the superior is free not to admit the postulant. If the superior is in good faith, and uses fair and ordinary diligence, without personal dislike or other inordinate affection, he is safe in either way in making his decision.
The first and principal effect of entrance into the reli gious state is that from the date of entrance is computed the term of the novice's probation, which is requisite for profession. In lawfulness of entrance, therefore, is founded validity of profession.
A second effect of entrance into religion is that the novice, so long as he retains the habit, cannot lawfully contract matrimony. If he should contract it, however, the contract will be valid. Entrance into religion does not bind the novice to perseverance and profession.
A third effect of entrance into religion may be freedom from every previous vow or promise. Previous vows are not properly abolished. During the noviceship they are suspended. They may afterwards bind, if the religious habit should be abandoned. The suspension is made by way of commutation into that which is of itself a better thing than is a good thing which is merely good.
A fourth effect of entrance into religion is to annul the obligation of espousals, so far as concerns the other party who remains in the world. He or she will not be bound to wait, but may at once contract espousals with another. If, however, the party in the world has waited, and desires fulfilment of the espousals, the other party,.
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if he or she has not persevered in religious life, will be bound by his or her contract.
A fifth effect of entrance into religion is enjoyment of the privileges of clerics. This includes not only the pro tection of excommunication from being bodily assaulted, but also the privilege of immunity as an ecclesiastical person from secular tribunals.
8.
No fixed period of probation, or term of noviceship, before profession, is necessary of divine law. Looking to the religious state in itself and apart from any religious Order or Rule, that state might be, and in ancient times was embraced without any definite noviceship, or novice- ship properly so called. The matter was left to the judg ment of the Bishop, or of him who had power to receive the donation of himself which was made by the religious.
Probation, by means of noviceship, is required in a ccnobitic religious state, that is to say, in a religious com munity.
By positive law there is required before religious pro fession a definite period of probation. This law was first introduced by private enactment of the religious Orders themselves. It afterwards passed into the common law of the Church, which fixed one year as the period of pro bation. This period was at that time regarded as in favour of both parties. Either the Order or the novice might renounce his right, and so by mutual consent shorten the period of probation. Apart from this renun ciation, profession before the end of one year's probation would have been null and void. Now-a-days, however.
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and since the date of the Council of Trent, in all religious bodies, both of men and women, and without any excep tion, there must be one year of probation. Profession made before this year has elapsed will be null and void.
It has been decreed by Pius IX. (Neminem latet, March 19, 1857) that in all religious Orders of men which have solemn vows, simple vows only should be made at the end of the noviceship, the novice being also then of the age of at least sixteen years complete, and that these simple vows are to continue for at least three years, at the end of which the religious may be admitted to profession of solemn vows. The same Pontiff decreed by Brief (Ad universalis, February 7, 1862) that profession of solemn vows in any religious family of men whatso ever should be wholly null and void, unless the novice should have previously made simple vows, and should have persevered under them for three years complete.
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The year of probation begins on the day on which the postulant is admitted into the Order in the state of a novice, in order that he may begin to be proved therein. There is a contract between the Order and the future religious. By this contract both agree to make mutual trial of each other in order to a certain .end — in a certain way — and for a certain time.
Probation supposes freedom either to embrace or to abandon the religious state. Probation is ordained in order that a man may ascertain by experience whether or not the religious state is expedient for him individually.
A novice has an habitual relation to and union with the Order into which he has entered, which he did not have when he was not a novice. This cannot be con tracted without some positive human act. That act is, in the case of a novice, his delivery of himself, with accep tance of that delivery by the Order, for the purpose of
F
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probation. This and all the outward signs of this, which are necessary to it, are of the substance of the state of noviceship. In this sense bestowal and reception of the religious habit is reckoned to be of the substance of the religious state.
In this way the religious Order acquires a right to govern the novice, and to impose upon him certain burdens for the purpose of proving and making trial of him. The novice is, on his part, bound to obey, and he is so bound that he may be compelled to obey.
Actual probation is not of the substance of the state of probation. If the novice perseveres in the state of pro bation, he is there persevering for the purpose of being proved. It is not his fault if he is not being proved. He ought not therefore to suffer for this. His not having been duly proved will not be any impediment to the validity of his profession.
If a novice should resist actual probation, it is thereby sufficiently ascertained that he is not suited for the reli gious state.
To dwell within the cloister during the period of pro bation is of the substance of noviceship in this sense, that wheresoever the religious is living he is considered, if he is living there under obedience to his superior, to be within his religious cloister. If a novice should be sent anywhere else by his superior, and even if he should remain there for many months, he will nevertheless be truly on probation, since he is truly living under obe dience to his Superior.
If a novice should, however, of his own accord desert his cloister, he will thereby cease to be on probation, that is to say, if he departs with the intention of not returning.
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It is not of itself sufficient to interrupt his probation that he goes away without leave. The novice must intend in going away to place himself outside obedience to his superior. If a novice were to fall sick and to remain in bed during the whole time of his noviceship, that time would, nevertheless, be a true period of probation, and he might at the end of it be professed. So far as in him lay, he was remaining in the state of probation. Absence of actual probation was accidental. Although actual probation is the end of the state of probation, it is nevertheless not of the substance of that state. In such a case, moreover, the novice would be sufficiently proved by means of his infirmity. The Order would have suffi cient knowledge of his character and fitness for the religious state. He would himself have experience of its manner of life, and even if he had not personal experience of its austerity of life, he could have knowledge of this in other ways.
TO.
The period of probation is to be reckoned from moment to moment. If the novice should put on the habit, say on the first day of January after noon, he cannot be professed on the same day of the next January before noon. Apart from this, it is not to be said that a year and a day is necessary. There is no law which prescribes this.
The period of probation must be continuous. There are two ways in which the continuity of the time may be interrupted. First, by profession before the end of it with the intention and in the belief that true profession is being made. The novice would be then no longer on
84 Elements of Religious Life.
probation. Secondly, by abandoning the habit, and departing from religion. He would thereby cease to be on probation. The period of probation would be inter rupted even if on the very same day he should repent. He will have again to be received, so as to be again a novice, and there will then begin a new and distinct noviceship.
If the novice departs with the intention of returning, and especially if he departs in the habit, his noviceship will not be interrupted, even by an absence of some days.
It is not by every laying aside of the habit that the period of probation is interrupted. It is one thing to put off the habit, and it is another thing to abandon the habit. He puts off the habit who lays it aside for a time. He abandons the habit who lays it aside with the intention of not resuming it. The habit may sometimes be put off with leave of the superior, or for the sake of penance, or by dispensation, and the novice is not therefore reckoned to have morally changed his state of a novice. Even if the habit has been put off by the novice himself without leave and against rule, or in order that he may more freely commit some sin, his noviceship will not be interrupted. By abandonment of the habit, on the other hand, the noviceship is interrupted, because the novice's state as a novice is changed. The abandonment, how ever, must be not merely contemplated, or begun, but completely carried out.
The same laws which establish a period of probation in the religious state ordain also, as a consequence, that at the end of that period a judgment should immediately be formed with regard to the fitness of the novice. If this judgment is favourable, he should then be admitted to
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profession. If not, and he is nevertheless permitted to remain, it must still be in the state of probation.
ii.
A novice is not bound in conscience to regular obser vance. He has not made any vow by reason of which this obligation should arise. A novice ought, nevertheless, to be in some way subject to religious discipline, so long as he remains in the religious community. He is not bound by any new or special bond of obligation to observance of chastity, over and above that obligation which springs from the law of nature. On account of scandal, however, and looking to the honour of the religious habit and of the Order, a novice is bound to observe chastity by a greater accidental obligation.
With regard to poverty, a novice is not bound to any action or omission which concerns poverty, inasmuch as he has not yet made a vow of poverty. By the law of justice, however, he is bound not to appropriate the goods of the Order, because those goods are not his own. To do so would be to commit a theft. This theft would be sacrilegious, since the goods of the Order are sacred and dedicated to God.
A novice can possess and dispose of his own property. He can both validly and lawfully acquire property, even without leave of his superior, either by testament or gift, or in any other way which is not at variance with his state, since he is not hindered from doing so either by vow, or by law. A novice who is dying in the monastery before profession can freely leave his goods by testament to whomsoever he pleases, passing over the monastery altogether.
An Order, even when it possesses the right of filiation,
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that is, the right of inheritance in name and place of a deceased religious, does not succeed as heir to an intestate novice. A novice who dies before profession is not truly a religious, and therefore the Order has no ground of succession to him as intestate. It has this right then only when the religious has rendered himself incapable of owner ship, and has transferred his right of property to the Order.
Donations and dispositions of goods during life are forbidden to novices by the Council of Trent, except with certain prescribed solemnities. Even with these, it is ordained that the donation shall be of no effect if pro fession does not follow.
This refers to donations of considerable value, or of real property.
Novices of the Society of Jesus can validly make donations, and renunciation of goods, without observing the forms prescribed by the Council of Trent, which in its decree excepted the Society. Donations made by the novices, after the first year of noviceship, are valid, even if those novices should not persevere.
As regards obedience a novice cannot be directly bound in conscience by a precept of his superior, since he has not yet promised obedience to him. A novice is, in like manner, not bound in conscience to observance of the Rule, since he has not as yet professed it. A novice is bound, however, not to give scandal or bad example to the other religious. He may sometimes be bound, there fore, either to abandon the religious state or to observe the Rule, at least in public and community matters. He is always bound so to subject himself to religious discipline as not to resist it by violence. This is necessary in order
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to government. There would otherwise be utter dis order and confusion. When a novice receives the habit he virtually binds himself to such subjection. He thereby enters into a covenant with the Order that, since he is to be supported, taught, and directed by it, he should, so long as he remains in it, submit himself to its religious correction. The superior of the Order stands to the novice, so long as he remains a novice, in place of his parish priest (parochus) or Bishop. Although the superior cannot bind the novice under precept to do works of counsel, he can nevertheless prescribe, and, if necessary, under censures, all things that his parish priest or his Bishop could have prescribed. He has power to do this in virtue, not of a vow of obedience which as yet does not exist, but of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction which has been bestowed on him by the Sovereign Pontiff.
CHAPTER IV. Religious Profession.
RELIGIOUS profession is that act by which a person, whose desire it is to be a religious, publicly, solemnly, and perma nently embraces the religious state. True and valid pro fession is so essentially of the substance of the religious state that previous to profession a man is not truly and properly a religious, while by means of profession he becomes a religious.
The donation and delivery which a religious makes of himself to the Order which he enters, or makes to God in that Order, through its Superior, is of the substance of religious profession. The acceptance of this by the Order, through the Superior, is also of the substance of religious profession.
In order that a man should be constituted in the religious state, a promise is not sufficient. He must deprive himself of the right which he has hitherto possessed over himself as regards his actions, and transfer that right to another.
The power which a religious Superior possesses to in validate any private vows of his subjects is founded not in his power of jurisdiction, but in the dominative power which he acquires over his subjects in virtue of their donation and delivery of themselves which he has accepted.
By means of religious profession there is transferred,
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along with the person of the religious, all his goods and all his rights, to the Order. Whatsoever he may hence forth acquire, whether by hereditary right, or by donation or otherwise, passes at once to the Order. The funda mental reason of this is because the religious has wholly delivered himself to the Order.
Besides a man's delivery of himself to a religious Order, the three vows of poverty, of chastity, and of obedience are of the substance of religious profession. They are of the substance of the religious state, and whatever is of the substance of the religious state, is of the substance also of religious profession.
The formal effect of religious profession includes at once a bondage and a sons/tip. The two, so far as God is con cerned, are not incompatible. The religious state is a state of bondage, inasmuch as it is ordained for the pur pose of giving to God homage and service. It is, at the same time, a state of sonship. The formal effect of religious profession has in it more of sonship than it has of bondage.
Although a man's donation and delivery of himself, and the three substantial vows, are in themselves and formally distinct, there nevertheless coalesces from both of them the substance of religious profession, by way of one perfect and completed moral contract.
2.
Some external formality, such as should sufficiently exhibit the mutual consent both of the religious and of the Order, is necessary in order that religious profession should be completed, and that the bond which springs from religious profession should emerge. This follows
go Elements of Religious Life.
from the general idea of a human contract. A contract between men, although it requires internal consent, is not completed by internal consent alone. Without external signs men cannot recognize and accept their mutual consents.
Although in religious profession it is principally a bond of obligation towards God which is established, there is also in religious profession a human contract as between men. Religious profession cannot therefore be made without some sign which is an object of the senses, as in the similar case of matrimony. The religious state exists not only before God, but also before God's Church, and it contains a special grade or class of persons within God's visible church. It must therefore be constituted by some act which is an object of the senses.
It is necessary that the sign of consent should be suffi ciently expressive of consent, such as is, for instance, an utterance of the human voice. Ordinarily, however, words are required only on the part of the person who is making profession. On the part of the religious superior who receives him, any external sign will suffice by which the superior signifies that he accepts the profession. Verbal expression on the part of the person professed is made sufficiently by his assent to interrogatories on the part of the superior who receives him, the assent being manifested by any external sign whatsoever, such as, for instance, an inclination of the head, as also suffices in the parallel case of matrimony. Taken in conjunction with sufficiently express interrogation, the external sign of con sent is invested with and shares in the full significance of the words of interrogation.
So far as common law is concerned, and apart from
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positive law, writing is not necessary. By the special law, however, of some Orders profession is made in writing. By the law of the Benedictine Order, for instance, he who is professed places his profession, written and subscribed, upon the altar. In the Society of Jesus, the vows are written and are read from the manuscript. Where this form of making the vows has been prescribed, it is to be observed, both in order to observance of the Rule, and also to remove all risk of question of validity. If, in a Rule which has been approved and confirmed by the Sovereign Pontiff, this condition is expressly laid down as essential, it must be regarded as essential.
Although it is not expressly defined by common law, the nature of the act of profession demands that it should be made before sufficient witnesses, in order to its being rightly made. Since by means of religious profession a special state in the Church is embraced, the Church ought to have evidence of the fact. By the law of the Society of Jesus it is essential that the vows of the solemnly professed should be read before some members of the Society and some externs.
The form of profession must sufficiently express the obligation of the three vows, along with the donation and delivery of himself by the religious to that particular religious Order in which he is making profession. The formulas of profession vary, however, in different Orders. In some of them the separate vows are not distinctly expressed, nor is the donation and delivery, as distinct from the vows, explicitly expressed.
3-
By religious profession a man is incorporated into the body of Religion as an actual member thereof. A
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particular member cannot, however, be really united to a body in the abstract, but only to a certain and determinate body. A man cannot actually be a citizen in the abstract and a citizen of no city in particular, nor can he be a servant in the abstract, and not the servant of this or of that man.
Neither Bishops, nor any persons inferior to the Sovereign Pontiff have power to admit to religious profession without incorporating the professed into some approved religious community. The Sovereign Pontiff has power to dispense from common law, and therefore, by the fact of his receiving any one to religious profession, without incorpora ting him into any determinate religious body, he is apprw- ing the state of that person and his mode of life as an individual. A person so professed would not be bound to any one of the approved religious Orders, but only to that state which he had professed, under obedience to the Sovereign Pontiff, or to some particular man as a special vicar of the Pontiff, in that private mode of life, and without obligation to any determinate religious Rule.
4-
In order to the validity of religious profession the formula of profession must be so absolute as not to include any condition which is destructive of the substatice of the religious state. If a man were, for instance, to be professed under condition of his retaining his property, this condition would be subversive of the substance of solemn profession.
Profession made under a condition which regards the future is null and void, so far as the bond of profession is concerned. Since profession consists in actual donation and delivery, it is of the substance of profession that this
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should at once take effect. Even if the condition should afterwards be fulfilled, the previous consent will not suffice. A new consent with actual donation and delivery will be necessary. Professions under condition are mere promises affecting the future. Although a promise, as such, induces an obligation in the present, the execution of the obligation has regard to the future. The obligation which is induced by a conditional profession would be similar to that of conditional matrimony, which is regarded as equivalent to espousals, which bind the parties to contract matrimony on fulfilment of the condition.
Reception of a habit on entrance into a monastery, or that the profession should be made in a church, being circumstances which are very extrinsic to the contract, are not of the substance, and do not belong to the validity of religious profession.
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Among extrinsic effects of religious profession, which follow, not in virtue of profession alone, but from certain privileges which are annexed thereto, either of ecclesiastical or of divine concession, there may be several — such as removal of irregularities — exemption of the religious from the jurisdiction of ordinary judges — reception of them by the Apostolic See under its own special government — and capacity for having pontifical juris diction communicated to them.
St. Thomas attributes to religious profession, and as an effect of religious profession, remission of all punishment which is due for sin, and this as it were ex opere operate. He does so on the ground that if a man by means of
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some alms can satisfy for his past sins, that man can satisfy for all his past sins who gives himself wholly and without reserve to the service of God. Such an offering exceeds every kind of satisfaction, or even of public penance, in the same way as a holocaust exceeds a sacrifice.
Religious profession is, according to St. Thomas, an act which is so excellent that, if it is made in an ordinary way from an affection of charity, even if without extraordinary fervour, it suffices, as a rule, to satisfy for all sins of the past. This effect therefore would follow, not from extrinsic privilege but, from the perfection of an act which is such as is religious profession. Besides this, however, there has been granted to some Orders, by concession of the Sovereign Pontiff, as for example to the Society of Jesus. a plenary indulgence at entrance into the Order, and another at the hour of death.
All previous vows are extinguished by religious pro fession, by way of commutation into something which is better than these vows are, and which comprehends them. A vow as such, and of its own nature, always includes the condition that it should not hinder a still greater good. Religion is a greater good than is any temporal good or than is any particular spiritual good which is or can be vowed. He who professes religion does not therefore act at variance with his previous vows. He is simply acting in exercise of a right, which was always understood as reserved in his previous vows. Those vows consequently cease with the conditions under which they were made.
A man in favour of whom a vow is made does not acquire a right in the thing which is vowed. The vow
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therefore remains a mere vow, and as such it is extin guished by religious profession.
In the commutation of a vow, the obligation of that vow is not taken away. The matter of the vow is changed into other matter. The professed must intend this com mutation. He who is already bound by one vow, and who makes another which is better, does not thereby commute the one vow into the other vow, unless he had the intention of taking the second vow in place of the first vow, and not an intention of conjoining the two.
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The bond of religious profession is indissoluble on the part of him who contracts it. His own will alone can never suffice to break it. He cannot of his own accord recover his liberty, nor can he compel the Order to grant it to him. This follows from the idea of perpetual bondage which is contracted, and the absolute donation of himself which is made by the religious in his profession, and which is involved in profession. Perpetual bondage and absolute donation cannot be recalled at a servant's or at a donor's will.
After absolute and solemn profession, which has been accepted by a duly approved religious Order, that Order has not the power, in virtue of its own will alone, to dismiss the religious against his will. The Order cannot release him from the bond of profession, nor can it divest him of the religious state, nor compel him to accept dismissal.
A solemnly professed religious, even if he should be expelled for ever from his Order, and exempted from the actual yoke of religion, always remains a religious. He
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may consequently be compelled by the Order, or, at any rate, by the Sovereign Pontiff, to return to the religious habit and to religious observance.
When a religious Order accepts the donation and delivery of himself which is made by a religious in his profession, the Order does not accept it as a merely liberal or gratuitous donation. The Order accepts it as forming part of an onerous and mutual contract. It thereby absolutely binds itself to retain the religious, to support him, to educate him, and to govern him.
By the expulsion of a solemnly professed religious, how ever just his expulsion may be, and even if it is perpetual, the previous bond of profession is never wholly re scinded.
It is not rescinded on the part of the religious, as regards his donation and delivery of himself to the Order. It is not rescinded on the part of the Order, which does not lose its right of ownership over the expelled religious, so long as he does not enter, and has not been professed in another religious Order.
Religious who have been expelled from exempt Orders are bound to obey the local Bishop, not only as he is the diocesan Bishop, but also as he is their own religious Superior. By their expulsion those religious have lost the privilege of exemption from the jurisdiction of the local Bishop.
A solemnly professed religious has deprived himself entirely of the power of retracting his covenant, and his donation and delivery of himself, since, so far as he is con cerned, he has absolutely transferred all his rights to God. His Order has, on its part, so accepted this donation and delivery as to acquire an absolute dominion over its
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religious subject, and that — for God principally — and for itself ministerially. This acceptance the Order has no longer any power to retract. It cannot retract it in its own name since the right has already passed specially to God. It cannot retract it in the name of God, since the superior is not entrusted with this ministry. This ministry belongs only to the Sovereign Pontiff, as he is the Vicar of Christ. He alone has power to dispense the goods and rights which have been specially acquired by God.
It involves contradiction to say that acceptance of religious profession should be entirely absolute, and that there should at the same time remain power in the Order to deprive the professed of his religious state.
The Sovereign Pontiff has power to dispense from solemn religious profession, and to effect that he who has been hitherto a solemnly professed religious should be no longer a religious.
The Sovereign Pontiff, as he is also the Supreme Prelate of every religious Order, has power to dispense in everything which belongs to any Order, and to cede the rights of any, Order for just and reasonable causes. Besides the dominative power which belongs to him as he is Supreme Prelate of every religious Order, he possesses also, and that as he is Supreme Pontiff, supreme jurisdiction over the whole Church. In virtue of this supreme jurisdiction the Pontiff is supreme dispenser of all ecclesiastical goods and rights. Among these there is included the right which is acquired by a religious Order over its sub ject, in virtue of that subject's religious profession.
The Sovereign Pontiff can, therefore, and that without doing any injury or wrong to an Order, dispense the
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profession of any one of its subjects, when he deems this to be necessary for the common good.
The Sovereign Pontiff has power to dispense from religious profession even in view of the greater good of an individual religious. The right which has been acquired by his Order is not a rigorous right of property ordained for its own private benefit. It is a right which has been ordained for the good of the religious himself and for the greater service of God.
As matter of actual fact and present practice, and so far as ordinary law is concerned, the Sovereign Pontiff alone has power to dispense from the bond of religious profession. As he can reserve to himself dispensation of simple vows of chastity and of entrance into religion, with still more reason can he reserve to himself dispensation from religious profession. The Pontiff's power follows also from his having reserved to himself the approbation of religious Orders, and from his having exempted them from the juris diction of the local Ordinaries, and received them under his own particular charge and special protection. During the period antecedent to this reservation by the Apostolic See, the Bishops had power to dispense the profession of religious who were subject to them.
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Religious profession, like other human contracts and vows, may be invalid. It may be invalid in as many ways as there are conditions which are necessary in order to the validity of it. Sometimes religious profession may be invalid by the law of nature, and sometimes by eccle siastical law, sometimes from an internal defect, and some times from an external defect.
On the part of a religious Order four conditions are
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required in order to the validity of religious profession. These are — pontifical approbation of the community as a religious Order — lawful power in the Superior who in name of the Order receives the profession — his internal consent — and his sufficient external acceptance.
On the part of the religious also there are several necessary conditions in order to the validity of his pro fession. He must have attained the age which is required by law — had a full year of probation — and be free from every such bond as would by law hinder the validity of religious profession. He must also, of course, be free from bias through fraud or through such fear as would affect a constant man, and he must have intention to make profession, and of this there must be sufficient external manifestation.
Sometimes religious profession is null and void in such a way that it can never be rectified or made valid. This will be the case if it has been made in accordance with a Rule, and in a community which has not been approved by the Apostolic See as constituting a religious state. Even if such a body should subsequently be approved, this will not be a ratification of previous profession. Subsequent profession will be religious profession which is made for the first time.
The vows, however, which were made in that invalid pro fession, although they did not induce the bond of religious profession, have nevertheless validity as vows, apart from any intrinsic impediment which may attach to them as vows.
Profession which was invalid is never confirmed simply by lapse of time, even if the defect, by reason of which it was invalid, should be removed, as, for instance, want of lawful age. There must, as in the case of invalid
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marriage, which can never begin to be valid solely by lapse of time, be reiteration of consent, after removal of the defect. This must be done in such a way as will be efficacious in the present to induce a bond of obligation. Profession which was null and void is, therefore, said to be ratified, not in the sense that the first profession now begins to be valid, but because in place of the first invalid profession there is now effected a new and valid profession.
He who is thus to ratify invalid profession must have knowledge of the previous defect and nullity of it. With out this knowledge there cannot exist a new consent, and sufficient intention to ratify the profession. It is not sufficient that during the time of ignorance of the nullity the person was in the disposition, and had the will to remain in religion. This is not a will to vow, or to make profession. It is only a disposition or will to fulfil an obligation which is supposed already to exist. Such a will is not sufficient to ratify a vow.
If the reception to the religious habit was null, no part of the term of probation which was founded upon it can be reckoned in order to complete the year of probation which is necessary to validity of profession. There must be a new and valid reception, and therefore an entire year of probation before profession.
If the reception to the religious habit was valid, but the profession was null, as having been made before the end of the term of probation, the whole time of perseverance in religion under the idea of valid profession will in no way avail towards completion of the year of probation. During that time the person was not on probation. It was not therefore a time of noviceship.
He who has been invalidly professed can lawfully refuse
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to ratify his profession. He is free to abandon the habit without in conscience incurring the ecclesiastical penalties of apostasy or excommunication, since his invalid pro fession did not constitute him a religious, nor did it bind him to perseverance.
An assertion made by a religious that he had no intention to make profession is not to be believed, even if he should confirm it by an oath, unless his statement should be corroborated by other sufficient proof. His external profession begets a vehement presumption against his oath. There is here question also of prejudice to another's right, the right, namely, of the Order which, in virtue of his accepted profession, has acquired a right over him, as well as prejudice to God Himself, to Whom this right principally belongs. It is furthermore to the prejudice of the common good and of the whole religious state. If an oath were admitted in such circumstances, the door would be opened to countless frauds, and nothing would remain stable in the religious state. By the mere fact that the person affirms and is ready to swear that he had not the intention to make profession, he confesses that he acted fraudulently and faithlessly, and that therefore he is not worthy of belief.
In order that the Church should regard a profession as null and void, it is not sufficient that it should not be proved to have been validly made. If there is a doubt, the doubt will be given in favour of the profession, as a doubt is given in the same way in the parallel case of matrimony.
It is certain, as the Sacred Congregation of the Council has several times declared, that the Renovation of vows which is made annually in
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some Orders, as prescribed by their Rules, which have been approved by the Apostolic See, does not render an invalid profession valid, The reason is because it is made of necessity by precept of the Rule. If, however, in any Institute, it is lawfully declared, and the renovants are previously instructed that their renovations of their vows are to have the force of the first making of them, if perchance their first vows should, through some defect, have been of no effect, then he who knows and understands this does himself truly will and bind himself afresh. This is therefore a true voluntary obligation, as real as is that by which he binds himself who for the first time makes his vows. This is the case in the Society of Jesus, as regards the renovations of simple vows, which are made by the scholastics. See Hallerini, Opns Theohgicum Morale, voliv., page 38.
An Answer of the Sacred Congregation of Rites, 10 January, 1879, with regard to the Renovation of vows made by Nuns, declares that a custom according to which the Sisters singly recite the formula of renovation, and then receive the Blessed Sacrament, the priest mean time standing at the altar-rails, and holding the Sacred Host— is not lawful, and is utterly to be eliminated. It declares also that the renovation will be made more fittingly outside Mass, and that the utmost that will be tolerated during Mass is that the formula of renova tion of vows should be pronounced aloud by one of the Nuns, and mentally ratified by the rest.
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* V
CHAPTER V. Religious Poverty.
THE idea si voluntary poverty includes both the will not to possess riches — and also actual absence of riches. Involun tary poverty denotes only the latter. This poverty may be an incentive to vice, instead of being a means towards progress in virtue.
As voluntarily to embrace poverty is itself a good deed of supererogation, so also to promise poverty by vow, and to consecrate poverty to God, is a work of counsel. It is an act which is better than is a good act which is merely good. From the words of Christ, when He counselled poverty, it may be gathered that He counselled also a vow of poverty. If He counselled poverty, He counselled perpetuity of poverty. To secure perpetuity is one pur pose of a vow. Moreover, when Christ counselled poverty in order to perfection, He still more evidently counselled perfection itself. The voluntary poverty, which is consecrated to God by vow, is more perfect in itself, and it is also more conducive towards perfection. St. Thomas observes that Christ, in teaching what is neces sary to perfection, comprehends that which is necessary in order to the stability of a purpose of perfection. This stability is effected by means of a vow.
In order to a perfect " leaving of all things " it is necessary that all things should be so left that they cannot again be recovered. In the same way, goods which might
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possibly be acquired in the future are not " left," unless they are so left in affection and will that they may not in the future be acquired and possessed. This necessitates a promise which concerns the future.
A simple vow of poverty may be made in two ways — (i) either by surrendering all private ownership or free use of one's own goods, but so as that those goods may be possessed by a religious community of which the individual religious becomes a member, or (2) by a vow not to possess any goods, but this without any change of state, or without incorporation into any religious community.
Although goods which are relinquished by an individual are possessed by the religious community to which he himself belongs, that does not prevent his having made a true oblation of his goods to God. He has deprived himself of his dominion over them, or his right of owner ship — of his right of using them — and even of his right to administer them in his own name, and by his own authority. That he still has the advantage of sufficient support is in no way contrary to the holiness and the religious character of a vow of poverty. The counsel to " leave all things " does not abrogate the law to provide for the necessities of the body. It causes this to be done with order, moderation, and humility.
It is certain that a simple vow of poverty which is made outside a religious community is lawful and good. Many Saints have led a solitary life, and have in that life practised poverty, and they most likely consecrated their poverty to God by vow, as for instance, St. Paul the Hermit and others. St. Anthony, St. Benedict and others,
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who were afterwards fathers of monastic families, began by exercising themselves individually, and devoting themselves to God in a life of solitary poverty.
Further, certain religious Orders~have been pontifically approved, and that with the highest of approbations, in which community poverty as well as individual poverty is observed. That which is lawful for a community, namely, to surrender all ownership of goods, must be equally lawful for an individual.
Voluntary poverty which is vowed in this way is not contrary to charity towards oneself. Human nature and human individuals need but few things. These can easily be obtained, either by one's own labour, or by means of humble begging. Neither is this kind of voluntary poverty contrary to charity towards others. No force is used, and no necessity is laid on others by begging of their bounty. An opportunity is thereby afforded to them for exercise of their charity.
The Church desires poverty even in simple clerics, but only such poverty as beseems the clerical state and dignity. Hence she does not admit clerics to sacred orders who have not a secured income which is sufficient for their support, lest they should be driven to traffic, or to actions which are unbecoming to ecclesiastical persons. In the case of clerics of higher rank, and especially for Bishops, she desires a larger income, in order to their due maintenance in a manner befitting their condition. She does not however exclude from sacred orders or from ecclesiastical dignities those who are voluntarily poor, and who have professed poverty in a manner which has been approved by her. Since the date of the Council of Trent she requires for secular clerics either a benefice, or a suitable income or
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patrimony, as a title, in order to ordination. Hence a faculty from the Sovereign Pontiff is necessary in order that any cleric, who is not strictly a religious, should be admitted to sacred orders on the title of voluntary poverty. A simple vow of poverty may be made apart from any vow of obedience, since poverty and the practice of poverty do not necessarily depend upon the will of a superior. A vow of poverty might be made even by the Sovereign Pontiff, and he has no superior.
2.
Since poverty consists in privation or absence of riches, the only matter that poverty can have is by way of privation. The matter of poverty must be that of which it deprives, in the same way as sin is said to be the matter of the sacrament of penance. The remote matter of poverty consists in riches, privation of which constitutes poverty. The proximate matter of poverty is that action or that relation of a man with regard to riches, which is opposed to poverty. This includes all that relates to ownership of goods, or right to them, or any use of them which is equivalent to right, or which supposes right in the using of them.
The remote matter of poverty extends only to those external goods, which are comprehended under the name of riches.
Although a man is not properly master of his own life, he has nevertheless a right to his life, and to the preservation of his life. This right he does not renounce by a vow of poverty. He cannot renounce it. It is not in his power to divest himself of his right to life. A man has the right to use both the members of his body, and the faculties of his soul, in order to the doing of his own actions, of which he
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is master. This right he can alienate. He alienates it when he voluntarily sells or gives himself into bondage. This right does not, however, belong to the matter of poverty. It is not reckoned amongst riches, which are extrinsic goods, but amongst corporeal goods, which are intrinsic to a man. Such intrinsic goods, so far as they can be matter of a vow, belong to the vow, not of poverty but — of obedience.
Internal spiritual goods, such as grace and virtues do not belong to the matter of voluntary poverty. This poverty is promised and practised as it is a means in order to the increase of these virtnes, and that grace. Any lawful inter ference with the exercise of internal spiritual goods will belong to — the vow of obedience. It will in that case be ordained as a means in order to the increase and perfection of these spiritual goods. Reputation, or good name, does not belong to the matter of the vow of poverty. No man can deprive another of his good name without sin, and a man cannot lawfully deprive himself of his good name by his own act.
By riches we mean money — and whatsoever is equivalent to money — and can be reckoned at a price — or can be con verted into money.
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There are two ways in which a vow of poverty can be made. The vow may be made wholly and entirely, as com prehending everything which the idea of poverty can possibly include. It may be made also partially, by a promise of poverty under certain conditions or limitations. A man might, for instance, renounce the use or the usufruct of property without renouncing his right of ownership. If
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poverty is promised simply and absolutely, without any limitation expressed or understood, the promise binds to poverty in its complete and unrestricted sense.
Dominion, or ownership, is a principal right to dispose of property to any use whatever which is not prohibited by law. The word principal distinguishes the master or owner of a piece of property from the administrator of that pro perty. That man is properly called master or owner of a piece of property who is the principal cause of any use to which that property may be put. Another man may have power to use a piece of property, by permission of the master and owner of it, and even to dispose of it to any use whatsoever, and nevertheless this man may not be the master and owner of that property. He is using it merely as he is the instrument of another man. He is un doubtedly in possession of A RIGHT, but that right is not a principal right. It is merely a ministerial right.
His Divine Majesty, as He is the one Creator, and therefore the one Lord of all things, has a dominion, or ownership, which \s principal, in the primary and highest of all possible senses. Under the Divine Majesty, the Son of God as He is also Son of man has a dominion, or owner ship, of excellence. A civil commonwealth has what is called altum dominium over even those goods which are the private property of a man who is an individual member, and subject of that commonwealth. This man has, nevertheless, a real and principal dominion, or right of ownership. That cause is truly a principal cause which operates by its own efficacy, although it may not be the chief cause in comparison with still higher causes.
Usufruct is the right of using a thing which is the
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property of another, without damage to the substance of that thing. Usufruct is called dominium utile, or dominion of use, to distinguish it from dominium directum, or full dominion, that is, dominion of ownership. Usufruct gives complete dominion over the fruits of the property, although the usufructuary has no dominion or ownership of the property itself.
Use is a right to the use of a thing without any owner ship. In usufruct there is real ownership of the fruits, although there is no ownership of that which bears them.
Dominion, or ownership of property, is the first and prin cipal part of the proximate matter of poverty. From ownership flow acts of ownership. Ownership is that by which a man is constituted as rich. Ownership neces